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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW'
CLIFFORD C. ALLOWAY0

INTRODUCTION
The
tunity to
is a vast
however,
provision
sentation
enforced.

author should note that the Florida electorate will have an opporadopt a new state constitution in 1958. This proposed constitution
improvement over the 1885 document in style and organization;
the basic political deficiencies of the earlier constitution (such as
for elected cabinet officials and inadequate parliamentary reprefor the heavily populated counties) have been continued or

The language added to the constitution by amendment was unusually
significant during the past two years. 2
The approach of the writer to decisional constitutional law is realistic
and modern in the sense that: (1) judges are assumed as necessarily creating
lawa in the typical constitutional interpretation problem and (2) government economic policy determination is assumed as the parliamentary prerogative 4 under separation of powers in representative democracy.

*Professor; Faculty Advisor, Miami Law Review.
1. Volumes 81 through 95, Southern Reporter, second series. Former Survey
statements, still apropos, are incorporated since the Survey is a continuous affair.
2. A selected list of amendments to the Florida Constitution is as follows: (1)
art X, §§ 1-26, adopted in 1956 (the electorate adopted a modern judicial article). (2)
art VIII § 11, the long awaited panacea for Dade County-Miami governmental problems--the state's first county home rule amendment, adopted in 1956.
3. In the first place the constitutional language would generally permit a choice
if any real interpretation is necessary, i.e., substantive economic due process means a
"reasonable" regulation of property. What is "reasonable" is judicial legislation of
necessity; see Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YAlE L.J.
571 (1948).
4. Compare CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPRE,,IF LAw

(1954)

(the tone of

much of which calls for judicial review by policy determination with BiklC, Judicial
Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative
Action, 38 1-IARV. L. Rav. 6 (1924) (indicating that the real problem in economic policy
determination by courts is that the judicial technique for factual determination of the
"reasonableness" of a law, is appallingly inadequate).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SEPARATION OF POWERS'
This section will be divided, as are the Florida decisions, into the
traditional-' fields of power.
I

JUDICIAL

POWER

A. Judicial Review
Study of judicial power in the United States is rewarding.5 There have
been periods in our legal history when our judiciary has greatly expanded
its office, at times overshadowing the supposedly "equal" executive and
legislature. There are some vestiges of that judicial pedestal in our Florida
legal scene.
In the effectuation of its review function the Florida Supreme Court
again characterized its work as mechanical in nature. 4 However, in the same
year the Court invalidated a legislative endeavor while referring to a Thomistic
(perhaps) requirement that legislative power must have the "sanction of
natural justice." 5 Such archaic concepts of the judicial discretion in constitutional decisions disallows reasoning which displays the ever-present
"inarticulate premises" embodied in the judicial conclusion. 6
Necessary Interest to Raise the ConstitutionalIssue-In Mayor v. Dade
County,7 the Court permitted an attack upon the validity of a zoning regulation that precluded plaintiffs from constructing a hospital although the

plaintiffs acquired the property with knowledge of the existing regulation.
The Florida Court has not clarified the difference between a judicial
question, to which judicial power extends, and the unique interest one must
have to raise constitutional questions. 8 Recently, in Ervin v. Collins,' the
Attorney General successfully sought a declaratory decree as to the eligibility of Governor Collins to seek re-election. Because the problem was one
of large public interest, and the plaintiff, as the "legal representative of the
people," was a proper petitioner, the action was authorized.

1. Read Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 144-153 (1956)
and 8 MIAMi L.Q. 158-166 (1954).
2. If any starkly defined separation ever did exist it was in a setting which was not
modern. See, generally, Dodd, Administrative Agencies as Legislators and Judges, 25
A.B.A.J. 923 (1939).
3. See, generally, POUND, TiLE FORMATIVE ERA OF AXiRnCAN LAW (1938).
4. State v. County of Manatee, 93 So.2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1957) ("We have no
power to tamper with .

.

. " the constitutional language).

5. In Greenblatt v. Coldin, 94 So.2d 355, 358 (Fla. 1957).
6. Certainly not a ver, original suggestion.
7. 82 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1955), llartnett v. Austin. 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956),
authorized plaintiff homeowners to attack a zoning ordinance on the basis that they
had homes across the street from the affected area and that they relied on existing
zoning when they purchased the homes.
8. Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 10 MIAMI L.Q., 144-145 (1956).
9. 85 So.2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1956).
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In 1956, the plaintiff, who operated an automobile tax agency, sued
a county tax collector for a license to operate. The court located a sufficient
interest in the plaintiff to sue on the theory that he was not merely a member
of the public who desired to collect taxes, but was a business man in this
regard.' 0
Review Procedure-To question the validity of a statute the court
1
insisted that the issue be briefed and argued.'
Administrators who wish to determine constitutional fact issues would
12
be well advised to read Village of Virginia Gardens v. Haven Water Co.;
in this case it was decided that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
necessary when there is no "prescribed administrative procedure available."
Severability Problens-The Court did not require a legislative severability clause in a statute that was partially unconstitutional, to expunge the
invalid portion of the statute. That the legislative intent was not thereby
destroyed was the criterion.
In Greenblatt v. Goldin,14 the apparent standard was whether the valid
portion of the statute was a "completed and workable statute." The Court
believed that the statute, if operated upon, would leave the legislative intent
too uncertain.
B. Facets of judicial Power
Inherent Power.-A 1957 decision' 5 explained the inherent power of
the circuit judge to discipline a grand jury by expunging legally objectionable
material from the jury's report. The Court's language classified the grand
jury as one of the circuit court's "appendages." The effect of this decision
would seem to curtail sharply the independence of the jury, at least wherein
its investigatory and condemnation function is concerned. Juries were
ordered to investigate and indict rather than to investigate and report when
the conduct of public officials and private individuals require action on the
part of officialdom. A jury probably will find difficulty in reporting misconduct under the directive that the report may "incidentally" point to an
- nUT
official.

10. McBride v. Overstreet, 89 So.2d 672, 674 (Fla. 1956).
11. State v. Miami Coin Club, Inc., 88 So.2d 293, 294 (Fla. 1956).
12. 91 So.2d 181, 182 (Fla. 1956).
13. State v. Newell, 85 So.2d 124, 128 (Fla. 1956). In a later case the court
was not able to accomplish the same end because the statute would have had to have
been re-written by the court to achieve the apparent legislative intent embodied in the
statute; State v. Tindell, 88 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla. 1956). Accord: State exrel. McCoy
v. Bell, 91 So.2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1956).
14. 94 So.Zd 355, 359 (Fla. 1957).
15. 93 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1957) (In this connection, the lower court was given the
power to "preserve the integrity of its records").
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The Court, in a very lucid opinion, 6 described the power in connection
with civil and criminal contempts as an "integral part of the judicial power"
which may be exercised, as to the facts and law in the particular instance,
without reference to a jury or other tribunal. Lower courts were cautioned
in the exercise of the power since the normal procedural due process requisites
are omitted. The classic distinction between civil and criminal contempts
was maintained, that is, whether the "nature" of the action inclines more to
private or public law. Apparently, the Court also authorized compensatory
fines in civil contempt actions to make whole one injured by a violation of
the court's decree.
In 1956, the Court evaluated the evidence before the trial judge, in a
criminal contempt action, under the "reasonable doubt" standard normal to
criminal cases.' 7 In this case the county solicitor brought the action against
a defendant for violation of an injunction against maintenance of a house
of prostitution.
Exclusive Power-In a disbarment action, Is the Court stated that "the
prescription of ethical standards, the designation of educational and moral
requirements, and the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are all peculiarly
judicial functions." Adoption by the electorate of Florida Constitution,
Article V, would seem to warrant the declaration of judicial independence
in dealing with these concerns of an "officer of the court."
Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Section 4.19 The Court
again refused 20 to utilize Section 4 as a power grant to legislate judicially;
in this case the absence of legislation enabling the plaintiff to sue in tort
against a drainage district obviated possibility of a suit.
Postion of a Court Rule and an Earlier Statute.-In Lundstrum v.
Lyon, 2t the defendants in a common law action pleaded a two year statute
of limitation under which an action was deemed to commence when the summnons was delivcred to the proper officer for service. Florida Common Law
Rule 4 provided for action comnccemcnt when the complaint was filed with
the clcrk. The Court regarded the power of the rule of practice, authorized by
statute or through inherent judicial power, as insufficient to "amend or abrogate a right rcsting in either substantive or adjective law."
16. South Dade Farms, Inc., v. Peters, 88 So.2d 891, 897 (Fla. 1956) (written

by Justice T'h1ornal). The decision quotes several of the major authorities on contempt.
Demetree v. State ex rel. Marsh, 89 So.2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1956), similarly describes the
contempt activity in temas of inherent power and also similarly describes the different
contempts.
17. Demetree v. State, supra note 16. The court defined the difference between
direct and indirect contcmpts as dependent upon whether the conduct is committed
in the presence of the court or not.
18. State ex rel. The Fla. Bar v. Evans, 94 So.2d 730, 733-734 (Fla. 1957).
19. "All courts in the state shall be open, so that every person . . . shall have
remedy ....
"
20. Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage District, 82 So.2d 353, 354 (Fla. 1955).

21. 86 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla. 1956).
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C. Jurisdiction of Courts
County Judge.-An appellant was adjudicated an incompetent in a
proceeding initiated in the county judge's court; the order was appealed
to the circuit court where a motion to dismiss thq appeal was granted. On
review, the Supreme Court stated that the county judge in this proceeding
acted as a court, not as a "special statutory judicial tribunal." Tlerefore,
the county judge utilized the judicial power and his judgment was appealable
2
to the circuit court.
County Judge's Court, sitting as a Court of
Supreme Court empowered the county judge's court
fees for services rendered to a legatee or a distributee
including the power to award a lien therefor, with
funds due the client from the estate.23

Probate.-Thc Florida
to determine attorney's
in an estate proceeding,
payment ordered from

Relation of the Circuit Court to the Juvenile Court.-In State ex rel
Watson v. Rogers, 2 4 the question whether a circuit court in proceedings
supplemcntary to a divorce and custody cause may exercise jurisdiction ovcr
minor children, when the childrcn have been declared dependent by a juvenile
court. Florida Constitution, Article V, section 50, authorized the legislature
to establish the jurisdiction of juvenile courts. The legislature responded
with a statement of "exclusive original jurisdiction of dependent and dein
quent children."--, Florida Constitution, Article V, section 11, grants
"exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity . . . to the estate and
interest of minors." This seeming impass6 was neatly resolved by the Court
which restricted the juvenile court's jurisdiction to matters of "criminality,
delinquency, dependency or other form of parental neglect," while maintaing the traditional circuit court jurisdiction over concerns of "bread and
butter and the spiritual." Therefore, Article V, section 50, was limited to
jurisdiction over children which does not involve child custody in a divorce
case when the "estate and interests of minors" are couccrned. The circuit
court's custody jurisdiction, in connection with divorce cases, would appear
to be complete.
Circuit Court; Appeal Bond Requirement-In 19572 the Supreme Court
validated a legislative requirement of an appeal bond as a proper condition
upon the right of an appellant to appeal to a circut court from a conviction

22. In re Freeman's Petition, 84 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1956) (it is difficult to determine whether the decision was based purely on statutory jurisdictional grounds or al
the constitutional grant to the Legislattre, affecting county courts, IFL.A.CON's'. art.
V. § 17).
23. In re Baster's Fstatc, 91 So.2d 316,. 319 (Fla. 1957) (implied powers). The
decision is supported by a contract for the payment uif a "reasonable fee" by the client
to the attorney.
24. 86 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1956).
25. Fi-A. S'rAT. § 39.02(I) (1951).
26. See Austin v. Town oif Oviedo, 92 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1957).
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in a mayor's court. It was indicated that an "unreasonable" legislative burden
on one seeking a constitutionally inspired review might not be upheld.
Circuit Court; Petition to Disqualify a Particular Circuit fudge.-An

attorney practicing in the E,'lcvcnth Circuit alleged that the defendant judge
was prejudiced against him to the extent that his clients could not obtain
a fair trial. The Supreme Court denied the power in the circuit court to
cnijoin one of the circuit judges from hearing a case over which the court

has jurisdictlon.27

Supreme Court; Original Jurisdiction.-A legislative statement conferred
on the Supreme Court "original jurisdiction

.

. . by injuiction or other

appropriate remedy" to prohibit the maintenance of a suit attacking the
validity of a bond validation decree when the suit did not follow the required
procedure. A 1956 decision held that the legislature could not confer original
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court which was beyond that delimited in
Florida Constitution, Article V, section 5.28 The court likewise indicated
that the statute contravened the "'exclusive original jurisdiction" of the
circuit courts announced in the Florida Constitution, Article V, section 11.
D. Court Review of Legislative Activity-General Considerations

In surveying the Florida Supreme Court's decisions reviewing the constitutionality of legislative action, for the last two years, the author believes
that the Court, in large part, has ceased substituting its collective judgment
as to what is "best" for Florida for that of the collective judgment of the
legislature-with reference to legislation regulating economic concerns in
our state. When evaluating economically inspired legislation, the Court
has always operated under the announced inhibition of the presumption of
validity. In the past the presumption has proved fruitless in many
instances;2 this aniamoly did not appear frequently during the present
Survey period. To exemplify this strange situation, one need only refer
to Shiver v. Lee,310 wherein the Court sustained a legislative conclusion that
Florida milk sales demand price administration (the presumption of validity
operative) and Greenblatt v. Golden, :" wherein the Court invalidated a
legislative conclusion that the position of creditors under the Mechanics'
Lien Law required strengthening (the legislative conclusion did not "find
sanction in the dictates of natural justice," whatever that may be defined
27. Ginsberg v. Holt, 86 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1956) (likewise, the supreme court

could not "interfere in the jurisdiction of the circuit court in any such fashion").
28. City of I)unedin v. Bense, 90 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1956) (the court may have
held that no legislative statement could change or alter the Art. V, § 5, grant, on the
theory that tile constitutional grant is complete).
29. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI LQ., 158, 161-162, 166143-146-150; 153-165 (1956).
175 (1954); 10 MIMI8 L.
30. 89 Sa.2d 318 (1a 1956).
31. See note 14 supra.
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to be). rule Greenblatt decision would seem to be the Court's only recent
fall from constitutional grace. "'-'
E. Court Review of Administrative and Executive ActivityGeneral Considerations
The Supreme Court again accorded a presumption of correctness in
favor of a construction of a statute by an appropriate state administrative
officer.-"*- Clearly the Court will uphold such a construction unless "clearly
erroneous.

In a series of decisions the Court has been attempting to discipline
administrative action that is not channeled according to at least the basic
requisites of procedural due process. For example, in Coleman v. XVatts,'4
the Court reversed a Florida Board of Bar Examiners' denial of a petition
to take the bar examination, because of an improper notice of charges and
the Board's use of evidence not disclosed to the petitioner.
In general, the Court has retreated from its old judicial supremacy wall,""
which was used to frustrate zoning officials. That the "lower court . . . should
not substitute its judgment for that of the local zoning authorities" under
substantive due proccess has become almost a constitutional common-place
3G
in Florida.
The remaining problem in court review of zoning necessity judgments
is that occasionally the Supreme Court, in reviewing the judgment of a
circuit court, that substituted its opinion for that of the zoning authorities,
assumcs the correctness of the circuit court's conclusion. 7
II

LEcSrATIV

POWER

Delegation of Legislative Power-iThe question of the validity of
delegations is generally included with separation of powers problems since
the concept of unconstitutionality here depends on a true separation. Delegation of legislative power as an argument is almost pass6 in the federal
system 8 and is not spectacularly strong in Florida.
32. E.g., Bedenbaugh v. Adams, 88 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1956) (p. 769, the court
refused to insist upon its particular economic philosophy). The court, at times confounds the presumption of validity by attempting to substitute, on review, a presumption of correctness in favor of the lower court's position against the validity of the
statute; Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d 798, 804 (Fla. 1957).
33. Green v. Home News Pub. Co. Inc., 90 So.2d 295, 296 (Fla. 1956).
34. 81 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1955); accord, Adams v. Lee, 89 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1956).
35. Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 NIhAMi L.Q., 158, 168 (1954).
36. Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So,2d 442, 445 (Fla. 1956). The court quite
uniformly upheld the conclusions of administrative bodies exercising discretionary judgment under delegated power from the legislature; see e.g., State v. Florida Turnpike
Authority, 89 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956).
37. E.g., Quattrocchi v. MacVicar, 82 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1955).
38. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)(not written as based solely
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Delegation of legislative power was upheld under a variety of rationale:
(1) that the legislature may "leave the determination of" the time when
its power shall become effective;30 (2) "if the legislature defines a pattern
to which rules and regulations must conform; 40 (3) "the statute sets up
and prescribes the standard;"'" (4) "the legislature has . . . delegated ...
with reasonable clarity a prescribed standard;" 42 (5) "the power delegated
44
is ministerial or administrative, [not] legislative; '4 (6) and others.
Validated was a statutory standard authorizing a court to make an
"equitable distribution" in connection with the Workmen's Compensation
Law, 45" a zoning power delegation to a board of county commissioners, 48 the
delegated power to the milk commission to establish prices for milk sold
at wholesale and retail,4 7 the delegated power to the State Turnpike
Authority to establish routes,48 and the authority to a municipal court to
revoke a driver's license. 49
A.

LEGISLATIVE

PowER,

GENERALLY

Exclusive Legislative Power-In 1956, the question was raised whether
the legislature could validly reapportion the representation of the House
of Representatives unless the Senate was, likewise, reapportioned. Florida
Constitution, Article VII, section 3, declares that both houses shall be
apportioned "at the same time." The Florida Supreme Court classified this
legislative duty as an exclusively legislation function, a question the answer
to which cannot be reviewed by the other departments of government.A0
on the war power), gave it a death blow; all that case required was that the Congress
lay out an area for the agency to work in. The congressional standard can presently
be sufficiently indefinite to permit the agency to experiment on the particular socially
troubled subject matter.
39. Mayer v. Dade County 82 So.2d 513, 517-18 (Fla. 1955).
40. Id. at 518 (also, the legislature must delineate the standards and clearly define
the "orbit").
41. The Insurance Co. v. Rainey, 86 So.2d 447, 448-49 (Fla. 1956). In this
case the court realistically related the "standard" ("equitable distribution") to the
work of the functionary to effectuate it and found the standard appropriately certain.
The case really involved a statutory standard under which judicial power was to be
exercised.
42. Shiver v. Lee, 89 So.2d 318, 323 (Fla 1956).
43. State v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 89 So.2d 653, 656 (Fla. 1956).
44. Smith v. Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1957) ("the municipal judge
tin revoking a license] merely follows the mandate of the statute;" the statute "merely
imposes

. . .

an administrative detail.").

As in Insurance Co. of Texas v. Rainey, 1H 21, supra note 41, a true delegation of
legislative power situation was not involved.
45. See note 41__supra.
46. See note 39 supra.
47. See note 42 supra.
48. See note 43 supra.
49. See note 44 supra.
50. Brewer v. Gray, 86 So.2d 799, 802-805 (Fla. 1956). Justice Roberts, in a
statement which dissented from the views of his colleagues in an advisory opinion to
the Governor, classified the entire legislative reapportionment area as exclusively
legislative in determining that the Governor's veto power should not extend to
reapportionment legislation; In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 81 So.2d 782,
786-87 (Fla. 1955).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. X1II

The judiciary disabled itself from ordering legislative action, or in this
instance, censoring legislative discretion.
Florida Constitution, Article III, section 21, requires that "notice of
intention" be published prior to the introduction into tie legislature of any
local or special law affecting municipal government; the manner of publication is left in the legislative discretion. The legislature has required that
the "substance" of such a contemplated law be published. ' ,' In Hialeah v.
Pfaffendorf,52 the Court refused to inquire into the sufficiency of "notice"
when the journal of both houses reflected that the requirements of Article
III, section 21, had been observed in the passage of an act abolishing a
municipal charter and establishing another.
Inherent Legislative Power-In a 1957 Advisory Opinion to the Governor,"3 the Governor was advised that the legislature has no inherent
power to convene itself; therefore, since Florida Constitution, Article Ill,
section 2, only grants the legislature power to extend the regular sixty day
session, there is no constitutional authority "for an extension of ali extended
session."
Authority to Declare Vacant a Constitutional Office-By reading together a 1955 ' 1 and a 1956"' Advisory Opinion to the Governor, it is possible
to infer that the Court intends Article IV, section 7, to grant authority
to the legislature to regulate the conditions under which a constitutional
office becomes vacant. The opinions concerned the unexplained disappearance of Circuit Judge Chillingworth. The second opinion ' may be
understood as stating that the circumstances surrounding the disappearqnce, when related to the lengthi of time the judge was absent from his
judicial duties, met the statutory "vacancy" condition.
Authorization of suiits against the State-Under Article III, section

22, the legislature is given the power to permit suits against the state and
its agencies. In Florida Livestock Board v. Gladden,"7 the Court presumed
51. FLA. STAT. § 11.02 (1957).
52. 90 So.2d 596, 598-99 (Fla. 1956) (however, the court did invalidate a
similar act subsequently passed during the same session where no notice was given,
even though the journal stated that the Florida Constitutional legislative requirement
had been observed).
53. 95 So.2d 603, 605 (Fla. 1957).
54. 81 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1955)

(in the opinion the court "assumed" the legislative

power, but declared the judge's disappearance did not meet the legislative condition;
Justice lobson's separate statement detailed the constitutional and legislative possibilities, but found no authority to authorize a Governor's appouintment).
55. 88 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1956). This opinion, by implication (pp. 759-60).
suggests a power inthe Governor, outside of legislative regulation, to appoint a circuit
judge under the circumstances portrayed in the Governor's question. Also mentioned,
however, were the constitutional and legislative "vacancy" requirements. Justice HIobson's
separate statement was more definite; lie related the appointing power action to the
legislative requirement, which lie found was accommodated.

56. See note 55 siipra.
57. 86 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1956).
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that a legislative permission to recover against the Livestock Board for the
destruction of hogs included an award of interest as a "legal incident to
the judgment."
Legislative Power to Regulate the Manner in which Appellate Jurisdiction is Acquired-The Supreme Court, "in the absence of constitutional
inhibitions," determined that the legislature could impose conditions on the
"privilege" of seeking appellate review; in the case an appeal bond requirement was upheld.5 8
III

EXECUTIVE POWER

A. Governor
Veto Power-Florida Constitution,
that "Every bill that may have passed the
a law, be presented to the Governor" for
Advisory Opinion to the Governor,' the
Court to apportionment bills.

Article III, section 28, provides
Legislature shall, before becoming
possible executive veto. In a 1955
veto power was extended by the

Convening the Legislature-A 1956 Advisory Opinion to the Governor2
authorized the Governor to convene the legislature: (1) in special session,
pursuant to Article IV, section 8,3 during a recess of a special session
previously ordered by him under Article VII, section 3,4 and (2) in special
session pursuant to Article IV, section 8, when the legislature is already
in special session by call of the Governor under Article VII, Section 3.
These powers of the Governor were related to the occurrence of an "extraordinary occasion."
Time to Act upon Bills-Florida Constitution, Article III, section 28,
provides that if "any bill shall not be returned within five days after it
shall have been presented to the Governor . . . the same shall be a law ....
if the Legislature, by its final adjournment prevent such action . . . [the
period is 20 days] unless the Governor . . . shall file . . . his objection ... "
The legislature had extended its regular session 7 days (to June 8th). In
an Advisory Opinion to the Governor5 the Court stated that the Governor
58. Austin v. Town of Oviedo, 92 So.2d 648 (Fli. 1957) (decision may be only
one concerning statutory intention).
1. 8I So.2d 782 (Fla. 1955) (vigorous dissent by Justice Roberts).
2. 88 So.2d 131, 132 (Fla. 1956). A third question of the Governor: "Should
the legislature, while in special session under section 3, Article VI1 . . . extend its
recess to a time following closely after the next general election, may I consider such

date of reconvening binding . - - without an additional executive call?" The court's
answer was negative.
3. The Constitution reads as follows: "The Governor may, on extraordinary
occasions, convene the Legislature . . . and shall . . . state the purpose .

.

.

no

legislative business other than that for which it is specially convened . . . [shall be
transactedl."

4. The Constitutional statement is as follows: "In the event the Legislature shall
fail to reapportion

.

.

.

the Governor shall

extraordinary session
5. 9; So.2d 603 (Fla. 1957).

.

.

.

call the Legislature together in
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had 20 days, after the end of the extcndcd session, to consider and act

upon bills presented to him within 5 days prior to June 8, 1957.
Time that the Governor Elect Assumes Office-In a 1955 decision0
the Court discussed the problem of when the official term of the Governor
commences. Florida Constitution, Article IV, section 2, states that "The
Governor ... shall hold his office ... from the time of his installation ... "
The Court determined that the incumbent officer continues in office until
the formalities of the installation are completed.
Governor's Eligibility for Re-election-Florida Constitution, Article IV,
section 2, forbids a Covernor elected for a four year term to be eligible
for re-election in the next succeeding term. Article IV, section 19, provides
for an election to fill the office if it has become vacant and a general
election occurs during the vacancy. A governor died and an acting govenior
assumed the office. Subsequently, a governor was elected, under Article IV,
section 19, for a two year term. The court held that Article IV, section 2,
did not prohibit a governor, elected under Article IV, section 19, from
offering himself for re-election for the normal four year tern
Power to Declare an Office Vacant-Florida Constitution, Article IV,
section 6, requires the Governor to execute the law. Article IV, section 7,
provides that "when any office, from any cause, shall become vacant, and no
mode is provided by the Constitution or by the laws of the State for
filling such vacancy, the Governor shall have the power to fill such
vacancy . . . ." In a 1956 Advisory Opinion to the Governor,8 the Court
may have utilized this language to imply a power in the Governor to
declare a vacancy in the office of a circuit court judge who disappeared
for over a year, in view of an accumulation of cases on the court docket
which the remaining judges could not seasonably dispatch.
Power of Appointment and Removal-The Court advised the Governor
that be could designate a circuit judge to preside at a trial in a civil and
criminal court of record of a county when the judge of that court had
disqualified himself.

6. 1lappy v. State, 82 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1955). Justice Terrell dissented, stating
that the time of the formal installation is a concern of custom in this state; he
,preferred the date specified in article XVIII, section 7, (the first Tuesday after the
first Monday in January).
7. Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1956).
8. 88 So.2d 756, 759-760 (Fla. 1956). The opinion is not clear as to whether
the Governor was given statutory or constitutional authority to act. The power of the
Governor to appoint was similarly in issue. See also, Tappy v. State, 82 So.2d 161
(Fla. 1955); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 81 So.2d 778 (Fa. 1955).
9. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 86 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1956). (Opinion
may be simply construing a statute authorizing judicial transfer).
10. Tappy v. State, see note 8, supra (Justice Terrell dissented because he believed
that Governor Collins assumed office before the appointment became constitutionally

valid; Justice Thomas also dissented).
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On January 3, 1955, Acting Governor Johns issued a commission
appointing Mr. Tappy county judge. Governor Collins assumed office on
January 4, 1955. The court held that Mr. Tappy qualified for his appointment under Article VIII, section 7, which provides that: "All county
officers . . shall before entering upon the duties of their respective offices,
be commissioned by the Governor; but no such commission shall issue
to any such officer, until he shall have filed with the Secretary of the State
a . .. bond . . .approved by the county commissioners . . . ." Tappy
executed a bond which was filed with the Secretary on January 3, 1955.
The Court'0 regarded as unnecessary under the constitution the approval
of the county commissioners, who had refused approval; the Court refused
to authorize to qualifying officials the power to frustrate an otherwise
valid appointment. Therefore, Mr. Tappy was validly appointed to office
before Governor Collins assumed the duties of his office. Removal by
Governor Collins was, thereafter, geared to existence of the cause for
removal stated by law.
B. OFFICERS
Qualification as an Elector-Florida Constitution, Article VI, section 1,
requires that a "qualified elector" shall have been a domiciliary in Florida
for one year and in a county for 6 months. In Bloom field v. St. Petersburg" the elector qualifications of a city commissioner were questioned.
TheCourt validated the commissioner's election by reference to traditional
domicile requisites.
Compensation of Officer whose Suspension is Revoked-A 1956
dccision 2' discussed the constitutional right to full compensation of a constable whose gubernatorial suspension from office had been revoked. The
constitutional statement'" that "no officer suspended who shall ...resume
the duties of his office, shall suffer any loss of salary or other compensation . . ." was interpreted to mean that the constable had to be reimbursed
by the county for net receipts received by an acting constable, including
receipts from private individuals.
C.

BOAaoS ANf AGENCIES

Effect of Rule of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission-Florida
Constitution, Article IV, section 30, was interpreted by the Court 4 as
empowering the Commission to promulgate rules which are the "governing

11. 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955). The commissioner in question had been absent
from the state, but was found to have had the necessary "intention" of remaining
"permanently a citizen." See also, Tappy v. State, supra note 10 and the text related

thereto.
12. Wright v. MacVicar, 88 So.2d 541 (FMa. 1956).
13. FLA. CoNsT., art. IV, § 15.
14. Bronson v. State, 83 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1956).
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law" in Florida. Again it was stated that the legal effect of such a rule is
greater than that of a legislative enactment.
A Pardon and the Operation of the Habitual Offender Law-The
1956 Fields v. State decisioni5 held that the constitutionaP and statutory
effect of a pardon extended to the felony conviction that the state sought
17
to utilize to validate an adjudication under the Habitual Offender Law.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-THE POLICE POWER'
The denial to government of the power to take or regulate life, liberty

or property is a concern of substantive due process-the disagreement is not
over the procedure to take, but over the validity of the very taking.2 The
Supreme Court of Florida apparently does not distinguish between substantive due process and the state police power.' Probably the Court views
the substantive due process as directly related to the constitutionally valid
breadth of the police power.' At least in theory," the state constitution acts
as a limitation on the generally broad state police power, and the limitation
is to be strictly construed.
The federal government, on the other hand, is theoretically one of constitutionally delegated powers, which powers are to be strictly construed.
In fact,6 the past course of state and federal constitutional law has been
very different. The federal powers have been immensely broadened by a
Supreme Court which, until only recently, cooperated with state supreme
courts in drastically limiting the state police power.7 This severe constitutional corset placed on state governmental power, by two judicial systems,

15. 85 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1956) (pardon was unconditional).
16.

FLA. CONST., art.

IV,

§ 12.

17. Also, in State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 84 So.2d, 9, 13-14
(Fla. 1955), the court apparently validated a legislative grant of power (it is difficult,
in reading the statute and the opinion, to determine whether legislative or executiveadministrative power is involved) which was further delegated by the Center Authority.
The legislative provision in issue dealt with the employment of various experts and the
establishment by the Center of their powers.
1. For recent survey of American due process of law, see Woon, DU

PROCESS

1932-1949 (1951); Brockelbank, Role of Due Process in American Law, 39
CoRNx. L.Q. 561 (1954).
2. '['he writer realizes that these concepts are not clearly distinguishable in fact,
oF LAw,

but believes this terminology is useful because of overwhelning pragmatic usage.

3. Garvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360, 364 (Fla. 1952).
4. At least this writer hopes so. A modern outlook would view the police power
as limited by only a few basic constitutional limitations-rather than private property as
an unlimited concern except for a few valid police power regulations. Life in Florida is
no longer agrarian simplicity.
5. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29 YALE
L.J. 137 (1919).
6.Ibid.
7.See, generally, Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
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may partially explain the heavy pressure on the federal government to
assume activities once though of as local in nature.8
It is convenient to break down the general state police power into the
various subject matters which in Florida seem to have the police power
thrown around them.

I

REGULATION OF BUSINESSES AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST

The Florida Supreme Court, unfortunately, is wedded to terminology
that has generally lost its effectiveness elsewhere. The traditional view was
that the police power was broad enough only to regulate a "business
affected with a public interest." The modern industrial state and its
attendant problems have cracked this concept-a valiant protector of private
contract and private property.' 0 The present Florida Supreme Court is
dedicated, theoretically, to a weakened power to review (which mirrors
judicial power, generally) the state police power by establishment of an
equally strengthened presumption of correctness of legislative exercise of
the police power.1 If this presumption of correctness means anything,
then the terminology "public interest" carries with it all business, and a
heavy burden has to be carried by him who would show otherwise.
A 1956 decision' 2 validated state legislation authorizing the removal
of communication facilities utilized in violation of the state's gambling
laws when the removal affected a hotel. The Court, in sustaining this
exercise of police power, referred to the hotel business as "one affected
with a public interest." Hotels were classified with the "beverage business,"
strangely enough, as "a fit subject for special regulation." In view of the
procedurally suspect'1 operation of the removal action, it is difficult to
state whether the reference to "public interest" was used by the court to
sustain the state police power, or to validate the procedures used under
procedural due process.
II

ZONINC'

The modern approach' to zoning and planning demonstrates a judicial
awareness that cities necessitate planned growth. The whole subject is
8. Examples are legion: such as social security, labor relations and education.
Witness the demolishment of the old "local" "intrastate" area sacred from the federal
interstate commerce powers, e.g., United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,

332 U.S. 533 (1944).
9. The Florida Supreme Court seems to so distinguish. Other states have trouble
here, also: McKinnon, Due Process of Law and Economic Legislation-North Carolina
Style, I DUKi, B.J. 51 (1951).
10. Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930).
11. E.g., Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Ass'n, 77 So.2d 465, 468 (1955).
12. Southern B. T. & T. Co. v. Nineteen Hundred One Collins Corp., 83 So.2d
865, 871 (Fla. 1956).
13. See the materials in this paper on procedural due process.
14. One could argue over inclusion of zoning powers tinder the general police power.
15. E.g., Comment, MUNICIPAL ZONING LAW IN CoNNECTICUT,

35 CONN. B.!.

162 (1951). See Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW AND
CONT. PaoB. 199 (1955).
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treated by the courts as expert ii nature. Courts are not such cxperts. This
requires a strong presumption of correctness for the findings of a zoning
board. The Florida Supreme Court has been remarkable consistent in
correctly utilizing the presumption of correctness on the part of the local
zoning authorities. Since the 1951 decision, Miami Shores Village v. Bessemer
Properties,10 the Court's record in this regard has steadily improved.
During the present Survey period several rules were judically announced to portray the relationship between the Florida courts and the
local zoning authorities: (1) a zoning regulation must not be "unreasonable"
as applied to the property in question; T (2) a zoning ordinance is "presumptively valid, so that the appellant . . . assumed the 'extraordinary'
burden" of proving the ordinance invalid;18 "the courts do not have the
right . . . to substitute their judgment . . . where the question [of reason,ableness, undoubtedly] is fairly debatable."' 9
Zoning for Economic Considerations-A municipality's ordinance regulated the size and location of advertising signs displayed by gasoline filling
stations. The plaintiff dealer handled a somewhat unusual product in that
lie only sold high test gasoline and at a price competitive to that of the
"regular" gasoline sold by other dealers; he proved that his earnings dropped
sharply after he complied with the ordinance. The nature of the area indicated that the ordinance was not reasonably related to aesthetic considerations and there was no evidence entered that demonstrated that the ordinance
minimized fraudulent practices. Decisional language quoted by the court20
indicates that the decision rejects regulation of advertising designed to
prevent "price wars between dealers." The decision would also seem to
foreclose zoning regulations that injure competitive advertising unless some
relation between the regulation and the public health, safety or morals is
entered into evidence by the defendant governmental body. This may prove,
particularly during a period of recession or depression, to be an unfortunate
court pronounced limitation on the state police power.
Zoning Based on Aesthetic Considerations2'-In Internatonal Co. v.
Miami Beach,22 a zoning ordinance was violated under which the plaintiff
hotel owner was ordered to remove or change the language of a sign
displayed near the sidewalk at the entrance to the hotel. Under the ordinance,
16. 54 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1951).
17. Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d 513, 519 (Fla. 1955)(perhaps an equal protection issue).
18. Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880, 882
(Fla. 1955).
19. Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1956) (also, the "courts should
be highly respectful of the decision of the [zoning body]; the courts "should tread
lightly in this field.")
20. See Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1955).
21. Ibid.
22. 90 So.2d 906-907 (Fla. 1956) (the sign seemed designed to attract persons
who were not guests).
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coffee shops and cocktail lounges were permitted in hotels for the use of
the guests when the facilities had no entrances from the outside of the
hotel. The comprehensive zoning plan restricted the area to various types
of hotels and apartment houses. Such a plan was upheld because "the
general welfare of the community depended upon preserving its beauty."
Equitable Estoppel-Recently, the Court explained the relationship
2
between equitable estoppel principles and the zoning police power. 1
Evidence before the chancellor sustained his decision that the plaintiffs
"had adequate forewarning" of a pending building set-back ordinance when
they applied for and received a building permit. The Court compared cases
in which an owner was injured by relying upon "good reason to believe
before or while acting" that the officials would soon reverse their position.
Contingent Zoning Activity-The City of Coral Gables enacted an
ordinance which, under its terms, was dependent upon the observance of
a number of conditions by an optionee to purchase the property sought to be
re-zoned. The optionee desired to construct a large shopping center and
the conditions protected the residential area that would be affected by the
activity in the proposed center. Effectuation of the ordinance depended
upon contracts to be entered into by the optionee and the City. The
Court's decision 2' obviated any possibility of zoning conditioned by contract;
the rationale was the ordinance must be "definite" in its terms, government
may not "legislate by contract" and that the zoning power "must deal with
well-defined classes of uses." This decision may not be very pragmatic. In
attending zoning authority hearings, one quickly learns that oral statements
by petitioners, that certain conditions to protect the interests of protesting
property owners will subsequently be observed by the petitioners, are the
basis for much of the defacto law of zoning; unfortunately, it is difficult
for the authority to enforce such promises after the zoning action becomes
effective.
Presentation to the Florida Supreme Court of a zoning situation in
which local government is attempting to enforce a comprehensive zoning
plan apparently receives more respect from that Court than "spot" zoning
25
activities.
III

EXPENDING POWER

During the Survey period the Supreme Court upheld several governmental spending measures: (1) legislation providing compensation for
widows of circuit judges whose death occurred before they were eligible to
23. Sharrow v. Dania, 83 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1955).
24. See Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956). The court, however, implied
that this decision might not regulate a case in which the application for a variance was
sought by a property owner.
25. E.g., Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880,
882 (1955), should be compared to Hartnett v. Austin, suptra note 24.
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retire or after they retired;261 (2) a municipal contract to expend money
of the city by "furnishing a utility [water] as an inducement to the "establishnent of a university in the city;2 7 (3) the expenditure of county funds
for a hog cholera inoculation program to supplement an expenditure of
state funds to accomplish a program which served both a state and county
purpose.28 In this latter case the Court, on petition for rehearing, rejected
the argument that it had the power to impose its economic philosophy and
invalidate the cxpcnditure as "a form of socialized veterinary medicine."

In Lynn v. Fort Lauderdale,-' the Court again suggested that government in Florida may not utilizc revenue from parking facilities to raise
"revenue"; such charges apparently are restricted to "simple regulation"
purposes. The author is still curious why this limitation is maintained by

the Court.
In 1956,8) the Court upheld a 99 year lease of public land by a
municipality to a non-profit corporation (a garden club). Florida Con-

stitution, Article IX, section 10, provides that the credit of the state shall
not be loaned to private institutions, nor shall the legislature authorize a
governmental unit to similarly appropriate money for, or lend credit to,
such institutions. rhe Court once more sustained the author's former conclusion, that the expending power is valid for "play," but not to enable
local government to build for the future. 3 '

IV BORROWING AND PLEDGING
The constitutional situation with bond issues is dealt with in another
part of the article.
Public Purpose and Borrowing-Under legislative authority the InterAmerican Center Authority sought to issue bonds to finance the construction of an inter-American trade center. The Court validated the issue
26. Green v. Gray, 87 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1956)(at page 507, the court stated that
"the legislature has the power to provide deferred compensation or pensions to officers
and employees"). Apparently in issue were FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 5, 10. § 5 provides
that: "The Legislature shall authorize the several counties . . . to assess and impose
taxes for county . . . purposes." § 10 provides that: "The credit of the State shall not
be pledged or loaned to any individual ...... Under the legislation in issue the county
was required to pay the entire compensation. See the tax police power section of
this article.
27. See Gainesville v. Board of Control, 81 So.2d 514, 518 (Fla. 1955) (the
contract was construed to operate as "long as the university remained.").
28. Bedenbaug v. Adams, 88 So.2d 765, 768-769 (Fla. 1956).
29. 81 So.2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955).
30. Rancy v. Lakeland, 88 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1956) (the Garden Club desired to
build a public library, dealing with things horticultnral, which apparently would be
handsomely landscaped). See also, State v. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreation
Facilities Dist., 89 So.2d 34, 37 (Fla. 1956), wherein a lease of public property to a
private corporation to operate for public recreation purposes was validated. FLA. CONST.,
art. IX, § 10 was in issue.
31. Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 10 NIAIN L.Q. 143, 157 (1956). The
decisions referred to in the present ease would seem to enforce the author's position.
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by characterizing the legislative objective as a "public purpose." Efficaciousness of the Center's tourist attraction possibilities for Florida's economy
2
a'
seemed determinative.
Similarly, the Court upheld a legislatively inspired bond issue to construct
and operate a racing and recreational facility to be governed by the
establishment of a governmental district; here the "purpose" was found to

be predominently a "public" one. The district's desire to lease the facility
for six months each year to a private corporation was also classified so that
the "private benefit" was "incidental" to the public purpose. 3
\7.

TAXATIoN

Taxation for Regulation, not Revenue-In 1955,-1 a city was permitted
to collect charges from its proposed parking facilities to meet bond obligations assumed to construct the facilities. The Court suggested that the
parking revenue could not be used, under the police power, to defray
municipal expenses "ordinarily financed by ad valorem taxation"; the fact
that the charges would be used for "simple regulations" judicially validated
them in some mystical fashion.

Jurisdiction to Tax-The Court' invalidated a municipal ordinance which
required a license fee of solicitors or canvassors operating within the city.
'rhe fee was partially geared to a percentage of gross sales. As a regulatory
measure the ordinance was upheld; however, the fact that the fees "have
no reasonable relation to the cost of issuing the license," combined with
the ordinance's application to a salesman from another city who carried
samples but made no sales in the taxing city, was sufficient reason for tile
Court to determine that the tax was an attempt "to confer extraterritorial
[taxing) jurisdiction."

Tax Exemption-Florida Constitution, Article X, section 1, provides
that the legislature shall prescribe laws to "secure a just valuation of all
property . . . excepting such property as may be exempted by law for

municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes."
32. State v. Inter-American Center Authority, 84 So.2d 9, 12-13 (Fla. 1955) (Particularly in issue was FIA. CoNsr., art. IX, § 10 which disallows government loans to
private institutions).
33. State v. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreation Facilities Dist., 89 So.2d
34, 36-37 (Fla. 1956) (the court mentioned that the tax power also was restricted to a
public purpose). See Lynn v. Fort Lauderdale, 81 So.d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955), wherein
the court probably limited a city's borrowing power, in connection with a bond issue
to pay for off-street parking facilities, so that the money obtained could not be used
to operate a "business for gain or profit."
34. Lynn v. Fort Lauderdale, 81 So.2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955); see note 29 supra;
see note 35, infra.
35. Bozeman v. Brooksville, 82 So.2d 729, 730 (Fla. 1955) (conviction sustained
for other reasons); State v. City of Melbourne, 93 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1957), is somewhat
analogous; here the city was authorized to extend water and sewer facilities beyond its
limits where the territory involved paid for the services and the entire operation was in
the general "metropolitan" complex.
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The legislature exempted the bonds of, and charges for admission and
other excises levied by, the Inter-Amcrican Center Authority, which the
author discussed earlier.86 The criterion announced by the court as a test
for a valid legislative exemption was "the character of the use to which
the property is put." The Center's activities were determined to be "educational" and "scientific"; that the Center was legislatively labelled as "an
agency of the State" may have been an additional validating factor.
Tax Districts-A 1956 decision, Fisher v. Board of County Commissioners, 7 obviated a legislative plan to authorize formation of special improvement districts with authority to assess the costs and maintenance,
thereafter, of street repairs and lighting against the real property within the
district. Apparently, the plan failed because the assessments within the
district were not particularly related to the "special benefits" accruing to
the various properties from the improvements. The improvements were
to be financed by a bond issue. If the particularized benefits accruing to
the properties within the district had been detailed, and the levies related
thereto, the district undoubtedly would have passed its judicial test.
Legislative power to create a special taxing district from a portion
of a county to erect within the district a hospital to be financed by a bond
issue was upheld by the Court.38 Chief Justice Drew, concurring specially,
noted that the present case was distinguishable from prior decisions disallowing an analogous district to be created which had boundaries co-extensive to those of the countyY0
VI

EMINENT DotAIN

Procedure-The Supreme Court again authorized an eminent domain
procedure which permits efficient judicial determination of the property
interests, while maintaining necessary procedural requisites. Under the Court's
ruling, the trial judge may postpone controverted title claims until after
the jury verdict on the value of the property has been determined. 40 This
decision is discussed under the procedural due process materials in this
article.
Time When Value is Determined-The compensation awarded a
property owner was geared to the value of the property "at the time of
36. See note 32 subra.
37. 84 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1956)(the decision may be strictly a homestead exemption
matter under FLA. CONST., art. X, § 7. If so, it has been discussed in the current Florida
Property Survey article in this issue. The decision distinguishes, at pages 577-578, the
"special assessment" levy properly laid on homestead property and a "tax," not so
properly laid, on such property).
38. State v. Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital Dist., 90 So.2d 809
(Fla. 39FN.
1956. .at 811-812. FLA. CONST., art. IX, § 5, has been interpreted to authorize
only a county to possess "The general power of taxation" for a county purpose.
40. Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312 (lfla. 1957).
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the lawful appropriation.141 The court stated that evidence may be entered
to indicate the uses to which the property "was or might reasonably be
applied." However, it was stated not to be "proper to speculate on what
could be done ...

to make it [the land] more valuable."

What is a "Taking."?-Threedecisions interpreted Florida Constitution,
Declaration of Rights, section 12, which states that: "nor shall private
property be taken without just compensation."
In Robin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist.,42 a constitutional "taking"
was not found under the plaintiff's allegations that he had planted peppers
on land adjoining a canal maintained by the defendant district and that
the district had sprayed the canal with a chemical which had blown upon
the plaintiff's land, damaging his crop. The district's activities were classified
as a tort.
Likewise, 4A governmental removal of lateral support from land upon
which a building had been constructed, or "interference with ingress, egress
and view" resulting from improvement of a public road was determined
not to be a constitutional "taking"; the Court limited its pronouncement
to cases not involving a "physical invasion" of the land.
Compensation for Restrictive Covenants-In a 1955 decision,4 4 the
Court permitted a school board to erect a public school building on land
that had been burdened with restrictive covenants, under the general
plan of subdivision of lands composing the municipality; the covenants
severely restricted the lands to residential type buildings. The restrictions
were held not to vest a property right in the owners of other lands in
the subdivision for which compensation had to be paid.
Inequality in Zoning and Eminent Domain-The Florida Supreme
Court stated that when a set-back regulation is peculiarly applied to a
particular parcel of land in a different fashion from property similarly
amount to an unconditioned, the application of the regulation "might
46
requirements.
domain
eminent
lawful taking" under
Dedication of Land and Eminent Domain-Statutory proceedings to
establish a county road under legislation designating a right-of-way were
held not sufficient to demonstrate a "dedication" to public use of the
designated road. Until the local government could prove a dedication by

41. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1955) (the "'time" is when
the government initiates the judicial process by filing the petition required by law).
42. 82 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1955).
43. See Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1956) (ingress and egress
still possible in this case); accord, Lewis v. State Road Dep't, 95 So.2d 248, 254-256
(Fla. 1957) (a change of grade in the highway was proposed).
44. Board v. Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1955).
45. Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d 513, 519 (Fla. 1955).
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the property owner, the eminent domain requisites demanded compensa46
tion to the owner.

Public hrpose-A condemnation
plaintiff's property to a lake, the lands
by the plaintiff, was determined 47 not
power for a "public purpose."4 Denial
by the plaintiff was decried.
VII

to furnish a public way over the
surrounding which were also owned
to be a use of the eminent domain
of a fine "fishing hole" to the public

TiE POLICE POWER-GENERALLY

A.

HEALTH

In 1956, the Supreme Court, in a splendid decision that accommodated
the regulation realities of modern business problems, greatly strengthened
the police power of the state to regulate economic subject matters within
the state. Shiver v. Lee4" authorized the Florida Milk Commission to administer generally the price structure of the Florida milk industry. The
Court correctly utilized the presumption that a legislative determination,
that a particular economic regulation is necessary, is constitutional under
substantive cconomic due process. Arguments that the milk industry was
not a business "affected with a public interest," and that governmental price
fixing depends upon an "emergency," were disregarded. The Court properly
refused to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature on the question
of the necessity of the regulatory scheme; the legislative factual determinations were not avoided by the judicial technique of declaring the legislation
'unreasonable," hcnce, beyond the state police power.
In a quite dissimilar case, 0 the Court found unconstitutional an act
rcquiring corn products to be labelled with the name and place of business
of the miller or manufacturer. As no cvidence had been entered in the
circuit court to indicate any necessity for the requirement, related to health
or any other police power concern, the court properly invalidated. The
Shiver v. Lee decision, discussed above, would seem to indicate that the
legislature (there being no legislative history materials available in Florida)
might well consider incorporating a statement in economic regulatory
measures which would explain the necessity-hence the "reasonableness"for the particular law.
B.

SAFETY

In two 1957 decisions, the Court upheld the power of the state to
revoke the licenses of motor vehicle operators under appropriate conditions, 1
46. See Pocock v. Town of Medley, 89 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1956).

47. Osceola Countv v. Triple E1 Development Co., 90 So.2d 600 (Fla, 1956),
48. See Alloway, Florida Corstitutional Law, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 143, 160 (1956).
49. 89 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1956). Fortunately, the court's language does not appear to
chain price fixing solely to the health police power of the state.
50. Eelbeck Milling Co. v. Mayo, 86 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1956).
51. Smith v. Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fa. 1957).
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and to regulate passage of trains by requiring the train to stop and be
preceded by a flagman over the' crossing,5 ' where a crossing was not protected by a flagman or electrical equipment.
The Sheiner v. State" decision discussed the state's power to disbar
licensed attorneys who become members of subversive organizations. Tle
state was not permitted to disbar on tie basis of the attorney's proper
claim of self-incrimination during the disbarment proceedings.
C.

MORALS

Fraud-The Florida Citrus Commission promulgated a regulation
establishing production standards and labeling requirements for "chilled
orange juice;" this product could not contain any additives. The plaintiff
desired to produce and market his juice with a sugar added to sweeten
the product. No health problem was presented by this additive. On the
contrary, the Commission acted to "protect the public against fraud and
deception." The Commission's position was sustained by the court as a
"reasonable exercise" of the state police power"4 to protect the Florida
citrus industry's standards.
The Court failed to uphold a zoning rcgulation of the size and location
of signs displayed by gasoline filling stations to advertise the price of their
product. It was impossible to relate a stringent requirement on the size
and position of such signs to a practice of fraud or dishonesty in
advertising. 5
Liquor-Miami adopted an ordinance forbidding female employees
or entertainers in places dispensing liquor for consumption on the premises
to fraternize with the customers. Also, it was made unlawful for the owner
to employ or permit on the premises any person to solicit drinks for any
purpose. The City presented evidence which demonstrated the so called
"B-girl" evils. Operating under the presumption of validity the Court sustained the ordinance as a "reasonable" exercise of the police power.56
52. Weeks v. Welch, 92 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1957).
53. 82 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1955). It is difficult to state whether the Court intended
to substantively prohibit disbarment on the inference of a self-incrimination claim, or
whether the court was only concerned with procedural due process.
54. Florida Citrus Comm'n v. Golden Gift, 91 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1956).
55. See Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1955).
56. Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1957)(IPEA. CONST., DrcL. OF RTs., §§
12, 17, and U.S. CoNsT., amend. XIV, § 1, were in issue). The last section of the
ordinance, prohibiting women from frequenting or loitering in any such establishment
to solicit men to purchase drinks, was upheld.
In Jones v. Sarasota, 89 So.2d 346 (Ia. 1956), the Court sustained an ordinance,
under due process claims, that prohibited operation of a beer and wine establishment, when
consumption is permitted on the premiises, and where the cstablishment is less than
500 feet from a church. The argnment proceded along equal protection lines; seven
negroes claimed that the ordinance only affected their operations. The appellants
were authorized to amend their complaint (if possible) to more particularly allege their
factual position.
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A section of the ordinance which prohibited any employee or entertainer
from drinking on the premises was not upheld. The Court was unable to
relate this section to the "evil" sought to be eradicated by the ordinances;
hence the section was held "unreasonable."
Gambling-The state legislation regulating communication facilities
when utilized for gambling purposes was again validated. 57 The present
decision sustained termination of telephone service of a hotel; the service
was being used "in violation of the laws [gambling]."
D.

GENERALLY

The Shiver v. Lee"' case (discussed above) may, perhaps, be partially
characterized as a validated exercise of the state's police power to regulate
economic matters, not particularly related to the subject matters traditionally
regulated at common law-such as health, safety or morals concerns.
Also, a confiscation issue was raised in Virginia Gardens v. Haven Water
Co.' 9 The Court insisted upon a "reasonable return on capital investment
and ... operating expenses" in failing to sustain the validity of an ordinance
establishing rates for a private water company; compensation for officers
and employees was included as a legal item of "operating expenses."
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
I

ADMINISTRATIvE DUE PROCESS

Notice-The Florida Board of Bar Examiners attempted to disallow
a petitioner to take the bar examination. Under the Board's investigatory
procedures, certain derogatory information concerning the petitioner's
moral character had been obtained. At a hearing before the Board, the
petitioner was asked a variety of questions, the answers to which ranged
over a number of the petitioner's past activities. All accusatory questions
were denied by the petitioner; at no time during (or before) the hearing
did the Board state any "acts of malfeasance" which were reported to it.
The Board subsequently informed petitioner that he "did not meet the
requirements for admission to the Florida Bar." The Supreme Court, in
Coleman v. Watts,' upheld petitioner's argument that the Board could
not deny him the right to take the examination "without at least informing
him of the general nature of the complaints and charges."
57. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Nineteen Hundred One Collins Corp.,
FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., §§ 1, 12, were in issue

83 So.2d 865, 868 (Fla. 1956).

as was state's police power.
58. See note 49 supra and the accompanying text.
59. 91 So.2d 181 (1956) (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, was also in issue-probably
the due process clause, although the court also mentioned the equal protection clause).
1. See 81 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1955). A complaint, filed by the Florida Bar against
a member for alleged acts of professional misconduct, which was determined to be an
adequate notice is related in State v. Grant, 85 So.2d 232, 233-234 (Fla. 1956).

19581

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A 1957 decision, Hickey V. Wells, 2 stated that procedural due process
requires "a procedure for disclosure [bill of particulars or a request for a
list of witnesses] . . . or else specific accusations"; the absence of rules
of procedure established by the Board of Dental Examiners was held to
require in this case a "specific accusation," before the Board could discipline
a dentist. Notice sufficient for due process requirements was said to be
that which allows "a fair chance to prepare a defense."
Hearing-In Coleman v. Watts,3 discussed above, the Court also
objected to the use, by the Florida Board of Law Examiners, of evidence
which was not disclosed to thc petitioner. That the petitioner was deprived
of opportunity to "refute any of the charges" by the Board's procedures,
or to be confronted by the witnesses against him, was sufficient to invalidate
the bearing (if one may dignify such procedures by the nomenclature
"hearing"). Apparently, administrative tribunals must base their factual
conclusions upon "record evidence."
A 1956 decision 4 authorized termination of telephone service to a
hotel under unusual procedures. In the case the Court held that "at any
time before the service is discontinued a person who considers [the
action illegal] may proceed in a court of equity to show" the illegality of
the telephone company's proposed action, thereby restraining the termination
of service. The administrative hearing5 by law was to be held after the
service had been discontinued. However, maintenance of procedural due
process requirements was achieved by the Court by the device of eliminating
much of the chancellor's traditional discretion inherent in the review of
administrative action by injunction. It would seem that the Court demanded
a full hearing before the chancellor on the legality of termination of
telephone service-an action which certainly could quickly destroy a hotel
business.
The various investigatory stages of the Florida Bar's disciplinary
procedures were sustained when the court did not require the "constitutional" full hearing to be accorded the accused during this period of the
Bar's activity. An opportunity for a "full and adequate hearing" before
the "final order becomes effective" was, of course, necessary.
2. See 91 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1957) (the charge was "permitting the . . .practice
of dentistry" by an unlicensed individual. The court required a statement of the
name of the patient, when the act took place and so on).
3. See note 1 supra. Much of the language in State v. Grant, sujra note 1, at
pages 237-238, is similar in nature as to the requirement of a hearing. See also, State
v. Evans, 94 So.2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1957), for a court statement on the hearing necessary
to discipline an attorney.
4. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Nineteen Hundred One Collins Corp.,
83 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1956) (Justices Hobson, Roberts and Buford dissented on the
theory that injunction proceedings are a matter of "grace" with the chancellor; therefore,
the hearing was not a "right" of the petitioner which he could demand before service
was discontinued).
5. Before the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission.
6. State v. Grant, 85 So.2d 232, 237-238 (Fla. 1956).
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Judicial Review-In Coleman v. Watte,7 the Court apparently required
the Board of Bar Examiners, which had adversely determined the petitioner's
moral fitness to take the bar examination, to provide "record evidence"
to sustain its factual conclusions for purposes of judicial review of the
Board's action.
Similarly, the Court insisted that the final order of the Board of
Dental Examiners, which ordered the suspension of a dentist, contain
"findings of fact which will provide a basis for rationally inferring the
conclusion which the statute requires."
II

JUDICIAL DUE

PROCESS

(CIVIL)

During the present Survey period there were several important decisions
involving notice and hearing requirements.
Sheiner v. State9 involved a judicial proceeding to disbar an attorney.
An order of disbarment was entered by the circuit judge after the appellant
refused, on self-incrimination grounds, to answer two questions: 1) I-lave
you ever been a member of the Communist Party? 2) Are you now a
member of the Communist Party? Apparently the state failed to offer any
evidence indicating legal grounds for a disbarment. The Supreme Court
refused to characterize the practice of law as a "privilege" and insisted
upon the constitutional hearing requisites, including "confrontation" of
witnesses, "cross-examination and fair trial." The "faceless informer" type
of secret evidence was stated as insufficient as a basis for disbarment.
Associate Justice Floyd, concurring specially, classified disbarment proceedings as part of the public criminal law. Associate Justice Jones, disscnting, classified disbarment proceedings as part of the "civil" law, in
which the normal constitutional criminal procedures need not be satisfied.
The dissent's position also regarded the practice of law as a "privilege," a
matter of "grace" from the point of view of government power.
Procedural due process was demanded-in the sense of notice and
hearing-before a juvenile court could permanently commit an infant for
subsequent adoption by persons other than the natural parents. The
juvenile court had reserved jurisdiction, which had already been obtained
over the natural parents, to enter further orders. However, the Supreme
7. See note 1 supra.
8. See note 2 sujra.
9. 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955)(the decision has a "substantive" issue, too-the
power of the state to disbar on the inference of silence before questions). Cross-examination may have been declared a due process requisite, which was not accorded, in Thomas

Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Employees Union, 84 So.2d 583 (la. 1956). Here the court
disallowed the chancellor's move to appoint a commissioner to hold a secret ballot
election to determine if the employees of a hotel desired a union to represent them.
At page 585, the Court stated that this deprived the hotel party of the "right of
cross-examination and the confronting of witnesses as well as the compelling of
witnesses to testify under oath."

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Court stated that due process and legislation required formal notice and
0
hearing before the effectuation of such a drastic, permanent order.'
The requisite procedures in civil and criminal contempt actions recently
were expounded by the Florida Supreme Court in two decisions. The second
case, Alger v. Peters," rejected the possibility of a party being "bound
by an injunctive decree regardless of whether the court .
. ever had
jurisdiction of the party and without . . . due process in the orderly course
.

of a judicial proceeding," with reference to the property rights of the
party. The appellants had acquired a property right before a final decree
was entercd in a case in which the appellants were not parties by service
of process, or otherwise. Therefore, the appellants, who had leased lands
from the defendants against whom an injunction, dealing with the land,
subsequently issucd, could not be held in contempt (apparently either civil
or criminal).
Ilt the first contempt case, South Dade Farnzs v. Peters,1 2 a civil

contempt order was entered against the defendant land owners for violation
of an injunction order, which order was entered after the act (leasing of
the lands to strangers to the suit) had been completed which was allegedly
in violation of the injunction. The Court determined that the contempt

proceeding was civil in nature and stated that the requirements of procedural due process had to be observed.

10. Noeling v. State, 87 So.2d 593, 597-598 (Fla. 1956)(een a waiver of notice
by an attorney was insufficient as a basis for the court's jursidiction). An analogous case
is Watson v. Watson, 88 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1956); the issue was whether the circuit
court had jurisdiction to modify the provision of a divorce decree which required the
father to pay to the mother support money for the children "until the further order
of this Court to the contrary." Tlie parties were personally before the court in the
original action. A copy of the petition for modification was mailed to the father (the
petition sought an increase in support money) who received it. The court held that
new service of process was not necessary, merely "adequate notice" and a hearing.
See also Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla. 19561, wherein the court insisted
that a corporation, which was not a party to a divorce action in which a money
judgment was ordered against the corporation, had to be formally made a party to the
cause. The wife was the principal stockholder. '[he issue was stated to be the due process
clause of the U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. But see Codomo v.Emanuel, 91 So.2d 653,
655 (Fla. 1956), which involved a judgment, following supplemental proceedings by
plaintiffs after an execution on a prior judgment, against the husband of the present
defendant. The defendant wife was only a party (by service of rule nisi) in the
supplemental action. Evidence indicated a fraud on creditors involving the wife and
the corporation in which she owned much of the stock. The defendant was "charged
with notice" of the fraud, in view of a "comingling of accounts" by all defendants.
Notice and hearing were held adequate. However, the judgment against the defendant
wife included attorneys' fees, the right to which arose because of a note which was
not signed by her. This part of the judgment was invalidated.
11. 88 So.2d 903, 906 (Fla. 1956). The court admitted that entrance of the
final decree could have affected the "res" if their property rights had been subsequently
acquired. Likewise, the court stated that a person who "knowingly assists a defendant
in violating an injunction subjects hinsself to civil land l criminal proceedings for contempt." However, in this case, the appellants did not "abet" the defendants, nor
were they "legally identified" with them.
12. Sec 88 So.2d 891, 898 (Fla. 1956) (both civil and criminal contempts).
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In a condemnation action,"3 it was held that procedural due process
was denied by entrance of a judgment "upon a matter entirely outside of
the issues made by the pleadings" since the party had no "opportunity to
be heard."
III

JUDICIAL

DUE

PROCESS (CRIMINAL)

14
The Fair Trial-In 1956, the Florida Supreme Court determined
that the trial judge's reference to a written statement by the accused as
a "confession," when the statement was not a confession, did not deprive
the accused of a "fair trial." Other evidence, about which there was no
legal question, and which was sufficient to sustain the verdict had been
introduced by the state.
It was held in Lloyd v. State'5 that the accused was denied a "fair
trial" when the trial judge adjudicated him guilty before he rested his
case; the fact that the trial of the accused was without a jury did not afford
the defendant the requisite procedural due process.
An instruction to the jury which contained a statement which inferrrd
that a juror who stubbornly adhered to his views was a "mule or a jackass"
was held a denial to the accused of a "fair and impartial trial." That the
statement would embarrass a juror who honestly disagreed with his fellow
jurors was determinative.' 6

The appellant contended that a statement, which was an "admission
against interest, if not clearly inculpatory," was involuntarily given. The
statement was made after one hour of questioning by an assistant state
attorney; the evidence indicated that the questioning was orderly and that
"no fear or threats were imposed."' 7
Notice-In Vann v. State,' the Court stated the "particularity"
requirements that should be satisfied by a valid subpoena duces tecum
issued in a criminal case. The subpoena "must specify with reasonable

13. Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312, 315-316 (Fla. 1957)
(the court's judgment had cancelled an option contract). Validated was a condemnation
procedure authorizing the trial judge to postpone title questions until after the jury

verdict.
14. Hamilton v. State, 88 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1956).
15. 90 So.2d 105, 107-108 (Fla. 1956)(the due process clauses of the FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, were pleaded). See the materials under
Facets of Constitutional Procedure, in this article, for the discussion of another issue
in the case.

16. Jones v. State, 92 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1957).
17. Thomas v. State, 92 So.2d 621, 623-624 (Fla. 1957)("the question of voluntariness should be more stringently examined when the party is in custody"). FLA. CONST.
DECe, Or RTS., § 12 and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, were in issue.
18. 85 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla. 1956) (also, the "categories of documents desired
. . . along with a reasonable period of time covered by the documents and a statement
of the subject matter"). From the court's opinion it is difficult to infer which clause(s)
of the Constitution(s)

are involved.

One might argue over the author's classifying

the decision under criminal procedural due process.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
particularity the documents sought . . . in order that the witness may be

informed what is required of him."
A recent decision l" characterized a judgment of forfeiture of a bail
bond entered against the surety company as a "penal sum." The judgment
was entered without provision for notice or hearing the company. This
summary procedure was validated, against due process arguments, by the
Court.
Attorney-The right to counsel was classified under criminal procedural
due process in two decisions. In one,20 a case involving the utterance of a
forged instrument, the petitioner did not allege that he asked the judge
to "supply him with counsel"; instead, he "asked the court for an additional
time . . . to obtain an attorney, but was advised that would cost him

money." Due process was held not denied.
The other decision 21 suggested that the defendant was denied due
process, among other things, when the court failed to permit defendant
to complete the trial of his case; he "had a right to offer such additional
evidence as he wished until he announced he had completed his case.
He also had the right to argue his case to the court either personally or
through his attorney." Failure to permit argument was stated to be a
denial of full benefit of counsel.
Grand Jury Statement12-The decision, State v. Interim Report of
Grand Jury," stated that the practice of a grand jury in reporting on private
and public persons, about activities of "wrongdoing little short of a crime,"
failed to accord the principals due process. The theory of the Supreme
Court, certainly a unique one under traditional due process concepts, was
that the report was a "conviction" of the principals in their community.
IV

CLARITY

Constitutional clarity in legislative language was dealt with by the
Court in four decisions rendered during the Survey period; none of these
cases involved criminal statutes.
Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v, Nineteen Hundred One Collins
Corp.,2 4 validated the statutory language which authorized suspension of telephone service when it is determined that a "private wire is
being used for the transmission of information .

.

. for gambling purposes."

19. Capitol Indemnity Ins. Co. v. State, 86 So.2d 156 (Fia. 1956).
20. Ilazen v. Mayo, 90 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1956).
21. See note 15 supra at pages 107.108.
22. See the text in the article under the section, Judicial Power.
23. 43 So.2d 99, 102 (Fla. 1957).
24. 83 So.2d 865, 873 (Fla. 1956) (the argument of the appellee hotel owner
regarded the legislative scheme as defining a "penal act." However, the sanction applied
under the "rtatute appears to be civil in nature).
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The court stated that the offense defined was "adequately delineated" by
the language of the act.
That statutory language which might normally be determined constitutionally infirm will be upheld in situations where the context in
which the standard is applied clarifies the meaning, was indicated recently
by the Court. In the decision, 25 the standard "equitable distribution" was
validated because the equity court's application of it would not be unique
in view of the traditional discretion exercised by equity judges.
Two decisions pronounced certainty requirements for zoning law. These
opinions"0 required a standard sufficiently definite to guide and "control"
(probably for the purpose of ultimate judicial review) the building inspector, zoning officials and the municipality.
CONSTITUTIONAL FACETS OF PROCEDURE
I

THE JURY REQUIREMENT

Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights, section 3, requires that
the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate. A 19562 construction of
this section authorized the trial judge to order a trial by jury under "sound
judicial discretion" even though neither party in a civil cause had demanded
a jury trial and one party objected to such a trial.
The Florida constitutional provision regulating the jury trial in cfiminal
cases3 was in issue in a recent case.4 The defendant, under advice of counsel,
waived his right to a jury trial. Subsequently, another counsel replaced
defendant's initial counscl; the defendant moved to withdraw his waiver.
The court stated that a valid waiver of jury trial could only be withdrawn
"in the discretion of the trial court," which discretion should be "exercised
liberally" in favor of granting the trial by jury motion. Factors the court
should consider included the following: (1) whether the motion is made
seasonably and in good faith; (2) whether it is made to obtain a delay;
(3) if some "real harm will be done to the public"-such as inconvenience
to the court or additional expense to the state. 5

25. Insurance Co. of Texas v. Rainey, 86 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla. 1956).
26. North Bay Village v. Blackwell, 88 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla. 1956). Accord:
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86, 88-89 (Fla. 1956). In this case the rationale for the
certainty requirement was that of "notice" to those affected by zoning law. The court
invalidated a zoning ordinance that was made operative upon the signing of a contract
between the city and the party desiring a zoning change.
1. This assembly of constitutional privilege and rights is as well treated here as not.
2. Shores v. Murphy, 88 So,2d 294, 297 (Fla. 1956).
3. Fi.A. CoNs., DECL. or RTS., § 11; 'the accused shall have the right to . . .
an impartial jury."
4. See Floyd v. State, 90 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1956).
5. But the fact that a non-jury trial costs less than a jury trial should not be
considered.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1I THE REQUIREMENT OF COUNSEL
The Florida Supreme Court again stated that in non-capital cases tile trial
court does not have to furnish the defendant with counsel unless the
defendant makes a specific request therefor, or unless the court determines
that the accused is unable to represent himself because of his age or mental
state.6
The decision, McMahon v. Mlayo, 7 stated that a presumption will
operate, where the trial record is silent, that defendant waived his right
to counsel; however, the presumption is rebutted when it is shown that
the defendant was "incapable" of representing himself. The mental condition of the defendant was treated as a fact in issue which should be
resolved by the trial judge.
The Court decided in another case" that the defendant's request for
counsel, to avoid a waiver, must be specific. Lastly, the Court regarded, in
Floyd v. State," the lower court's action, in completing a criminal case
without permitting the defendant's counsel to argue his case, as a denial
of "full benefit of counsel."
III

THE BAIL REOUIREMENT

General Considerations-Ina 1956 case,10 the Court stated the general
purpose of the constitutional and statutory bail provisions, in this language:
"[these provisions] relating to release on bail in criminal cases were designed
to secure to an accused person the right to be in the custody of a friendly
jailer of his own choice [generally a surety company] rather than in the ...
prison cell."
"Where the Proof is Evident or the Presumption Great"-" This constitutional statement requires bail unless the "proof is evident or the presumption great." In a murder case' 2 it was determined that the state must
make a "clear showing that appellant was guilty" of the crime to permit
the trial judge to deny bail, and that the defendant's version of the
situation must be assumed as true unless there is other evidence "legally
sufficient" to contradict it.
Subsequently, the Court stated'3 that the state's necessary degree of
proof, in this connection, is greater than that required to convict a defendant
in a criminal case.
6. Sheffield v. State, 90 So.2d 449, 450 (Fla. 1956).
7. 92 So.2d 806, 809 (Fla. 1957).

8. Hazen v. Mayo. 90 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1956) (a due process issue involved).
9. 90 So.2d 105, 108 (Fla. 1956) (From the opinion it is difficult to determine
whether state constitutional law, or both state and federal constitutional law, are
involved).
10. See Capitol Indemnity Ins. Co. v. State, 86 So.2d 156, 157 (Fla. 1956).

11.

FLA. CONST., DECL. OF RTS, § 9.

12. Freeman v. Kelly, 86 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1956)(defendant claimed self-defense).
13. State v. Williams, 87 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1956).
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Bail after Conviction-The trial judge's discretion was suggested to
be channeled along these lines: (1) whether the appeal is taken merely
for delay; (2) whether the appeal grounds are "fairly debatable" legal
issues; (3) whether the circumstances indicate the defendant is likely to
14
flee.
Evidentiary picture in habeas corpus and bail petitions-In Kelly v.
State,15 it was reported that the rule, that a court on habeas corpus proceedings should not inquire into the sufficiency of evidence to support an
information or indictment, does not prevent examination of the evidence
to determine if, in a capital case, the accused has a right to bail.
IV DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Void Judgment-When a defendant successfully petitioned to have
a former judgment of conviction set aside because a procedural due process
notice requirement was not satisfied, he could not plead former jeopardy
because the prior judgment was "void."' 1
Substantive Crime and Conspiracy-The court reiterated its position,
that punishment for a conspiracy to commit a crime and for the "overt act
which is the object of the conspiracy," does not constitute double jeopardy.1
These were classified as separate and distinct offenses.
When jeopardy Attaches; Grounds to Discharge a Jury-An accused
is placed in jeopardy when he is placed on trial under notice of the charges,
sufficient to sustain a conviction, before a court of legal jurisdiction and the
jury has been "impaneled and sworn and charged with his deliverance."
After jeopardy attaches the judge should discharge the jury only in cases
of "manifestly urgent and absolute necessity.""'
Automobile License Revocation and Jeopardy-Petitioncr was convicted
by a municipal court for driving while intoxicated. A statute authorizes such
courts to revoke a defendant's driver's license. The Court held'0 that the
statute did not provide a double punishment for a single offense, by
classifying the judgment of revocation as a civil sanction.

14. Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1956) (also, whether, when the
term of imprisonment is short, the denial of bail would "render nugatory" the right

to appeal).

15. Le Kelly v. State, 92 So.2d 172, 175 (Fla. 1957).

16. Tilghman v. Mayo, 82 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1955).
17. Blackburn v. State, 83 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 1955) (a count for conspiracy to
violate the lottery laws and one for violation of the "substantive" lottery provisions).
18. State v. Grayson, 90 So.2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1956) (factors to guide the judge in
discharging a jury: (1) illness of the judge, or a juror; (2) the inability of a jury to
agree; (3) consent of the accused).
19. See Smith v. Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1957) (the opinion does not
sPecifically classify the license revocation in this manner). Perhaps not a double jeopardy
issue.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Waiver of Defense-The Supreme Court consistently 20 has held that
a defendant waives the double jeopardy privilege if he successfully requests
a jury discharge on a ground which is legally insufficient. In State v.
Grayson,2 the Court stated that a waiver does not attach to the defendant
if he fails to object when the jury is discharged on such a ground. Under
the facts in the case the defendant bad moved for a mistrial. Subsequently,
the state sought to join in the defendant's similar motions. The defense
counsel stated that he had no objection, but qualified his statement by
saying that "I wouldn't bind myself" on the question of whether the
situation would lead to a valid double jeopardy plea. The Court required
an affirmative (express) consent by the defendant to the state's motion
before determining the defendant had waived the privilege.
Proper Plea of Double Jeopardy-The Court required information to

be reflected in a valid plea of double jeopardy which would show the
"necessary matters of record" as to the former charge against the defendant
and what occurred to it. The defendant's statement was that "your defen22dant has heretofore been in jeopardy for commission of the same offense."
Failure of Trial Judge to Vacate an Imprisonment Term-A sentence

imposed upon the petitioner pursuant to the Habitual Criminal Act was
not void as unconstitutionally placing petitioner twice in jeopardy, even
though the trial judge did not initially vacate a six year prison term judgment. The Court again refused to characterize the habitual offender statute
life imprisonment term as providing a punishment for a separate and
23
distinct offense.
V

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL

PUNISHMENT

In three cases the Court refused to censor the state's power to authorize
sanctions under this constitutional provision. 24 The court held that a
sentence of 15 years in the state prison following a conviction of man25 likewise a sentence of 20 years
slaughter was not an "excessive" sentence;
26
invalidated.
not
was
manslaughter
for

20. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 143, 177 (1956).
21. 90 So,2d 710, 712-714 (Fla. 1956). In State v. Bentley, 81 So.2d 750 (Fla.
1955), the appellees moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence
produced by the state showed the larceny of a bull, not a cow as charged by the state
in the information. The court again held that where the defendant maintained at the
first trial that the variance was material, he could not subsequently claim, for purposes
of a double jeopardy plea, that the variance was not material (hence the court's action
in granting the motion was improper).
22. See Marshall v. State, 89 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1956).
23. Washington v. Mayo, 91 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 1957).
24. FLA. CONST., DEeL. OF RTS, § 8: "nor [shall] cruel or unusual punishment . . .
be allowed."
25. Emmett v. State, 89 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1956).
26. Hutley v. State, 94 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1957).
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In Wright v. State,27 the defendant argued that his conviction under a
statute pcnalizing the concealment of liquor ("moonshine"), upon which
a tax had not been paid, led to a cruel and unusual punishment because
the definition of "moonshine" infers the non-payment of proper taxes. The
Court stated that concealment is one thing and tax payments are another;
therefore, the defendant was not required to observe a law "impossible" to
28
obey.
VI Tin, COMPULSORY PROCESS REQUIREMENT
One decision 2a' reported the general purpose of this constitutional
necessity. 0 A state witness testified before a grand jury prior to the trial
of this case. The defendant unsuccessfully attempted to secure a transcript
of the witness' earlier tcstimony. At the trial when the witness was tendered
for defendant's cross-examination, the defendants applied to the court for
a subpoena duces tecum to be directed to the official court reporter for
the grand jury. The application stated that the grand jury testimony was
material to, and in conflict with, the witness' testimony on direct examination. The Supreme Court determined that the purpose of the constitutional
requirement was to obviate the unfairness resulting from trying a defendant
without providing a means of compelling witnesses to testify to material
facts; the Court reversed the lower court.
SELF INCRIMINATION
Attorney Privilege in Disbarment Proceedings-Sheiner v. State,' has
been discussed in the procedural due process materials in this article. However, the decision emphasizes a self-incrimination issue, distinct from due
process requisites. The Court authorized attorneys who are involved in
disbarment proceedings to plead the privilege on the same basis as any
other citizen. To reach this result the Court apparently classified the
disbarment sanction as more criminal, than civil, in nature. The only
disturbing statements in the opinion, from the point of view of liberal
effectuation of the Florida privilege, were those which indicated that the
attorney "should have been candid with the court." The practice of law
was definitely classified as a "right," not a "privilege" (unlike the "teacher,"
the police officer, the security risk," etc.) and the state was not permitted
to disbar on the slender inferential ground of the privilege claim. Why
teachers, and so on, should not be accorded similar constitutional respect
was not clarified.
27. 87So.2d 104, 105 (Fla. 1956).
28. This section could be classified under constitutional provisions which deny to
the state government the power to accomplish some objective.
29. Trafficant v. State, 92 So.2d 811, 814-815 (Fla. 1957).
30. FLA. CoNsr., DiCL. or RTs., § 11: in all criminal cases the accused "shall
have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses in his favor." The defendants
also argued the federal constitutional law on this issue.
1. Sec 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955) (a vehement dissent was written by Associate
Justice Jones). Federal and state constitutional law were not distinguished.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Corporate Privilege-Vann v. State2 involved a subpoena duces tecum
directed by the state against a non-party insurance company for certain
documents in a criminal prosecution of the insured for culpable negligence.
Both the United States Constiution's Fifth Amendment and the Florida
constitutional provision on self-incrimination were pleaded. The Court
again stated that a corporation may not plead these privileges, for itself or
for another.
Judicial Comment on the Defendant's Failure to Take the Stand A trial judge's comment to the defendant, preliminary to the sentencing,
which indicated that the judge believed the defendant guilty because he did
not testify, was criticized by the Court in a 1956 case. '
Summary Judgment and a Defendant's Affidavit Plea-A trial judge
struck defendant's counter-affidavit because the defendant refused to testify
on the plaintiff's taking of his deposition on the ground of self-incrimination.
The defendant had denied the allegations of the complaint in the plaintiff's
paternity suit. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment asserting
that there were no factual issues to be tried. The defendant's affidavit, in
opposition to the motion, denied paternity and the allegations of intimate
relations with the plaintiff. The plaintiff then attempted to take the defendant's deposition and questioned him in connection with these factual
issues. The defendant avoided the questions by pleading the self-incrimination
clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
The Supreme Court 4 noted that the questions that the defendant refused
to answer were such as would justify the constitutional plea and that he was
not questioned as to whether he could support his affidavit allegations by
witnesses other than himself. The court failed to find a waiver of the privilege from a denial of the allegations of the plaintiff. If the defendant had no
testimony to support his affidavit, other than his own, it was indicated that
summary judgment would follow.
Confessions'-The Court suggested that trial judges, before allowing an
admission or confession to go to the jury, should first hear all the evidence
offered on the manner in which the statement was obtained. The fact
that a confession is made while the accused is in custody was stated not to
be "determinative" as to whether the statement is voluntary.
2. See 85 So.2d 133 (Fla, 1956). The court's references to federal constitutional
law are inaccurate; the U.S. CO ST., amend XIV, does not (through the due process
clause) apply the U. S. constitutional inhibition on self-incrimination, or searches and
seizures, to the states.
3. Davis v. State, 90 So.2d 629, 632 (Fla. 1956).
4. See Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1957) (the court also considered the fact that the lower court could discipline, in other ways, the filing of an

affidavit in bad faith).

5. It is difficult to state whether or not the Florida court treats the entrance
of confession into evidence as a facet of self-incrimination; see FLA. CONST., DECL. OF
RTS., § 12: "No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."
6. Graham v. State, 91 So.2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1956).
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
I

ARREST SITUATIONS

Automobile Cases-The Florida constitutional law validating government searches associated with valid arrests is becoming settled.' Unpredictability remains only for the new variations of basic fact situations which,
in general, have been dealt with by the Court in recent years.
Several decisions involved arrests for illegal driving actions, followed
by a search and seizure. In State v. Simmons,2 there was a valid arrest by
officers for reckless driving. This was followed by a valid arrest of the
defendant for possessing bolita tickets, which were in plain view on the
seat of his car. The search and seizure following their arrest was held
"reasonable." It was not necessary to formally charge the defendant with
a violation of the gambling laws before commencing the search. Perhaps
the validity ("reasonableness") of the search was weakened by the fact
that the officers had information from "an unknown source" that the
defendant was violating the gambling laws and were following him because
of that information.
A similar case," involving a traffic violation arrest, authorized officers
to search after they noticed and smelled a liquid escaping from the car.
'When they approached the car the defendant was attempting to smash a
jug of "moonshine" against the dashboard. One of the officers testified that
from "experience" he could identify the smell and taste of "moonshine."
One decision 4 detailed the law of valid arrest and search of a parked
truck; the truck was located close to a dark intersection, without lights,
and was unattended. It was also parked in a fashion which constituted a
traffic hazard, The officers looked inside the vehicle and located under the
seat some "bolita pay slips" and money. Upon his arrival the defendant
was arrested for illegal parking. The Court held that the search, even
though it preceded the arrest, was "reasonable" under the circumstances.
Other cases-The arresting officer had been advised that a "moonshine"
still was in operation on the defendant's premises; the officer testified that
he was able to smell the odor of fermenting mash after his arrival and
1. See AlIloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 10

MIAMI

L.Q., 143, 182-185 (Fla.

2. 85 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1956). Accord: Brown v. State, 91 So.Zd 175 (Fla. 1956).

In this case the defendant's car weaved back and forth. Officers had had a "tip" to

"look out" for the car. When stopped, the defendant told the officer that he had been

drinking and a bottle was on the seat beside him. He was arrested for reckless driving.
The position of the car indicated that the back of it was heavily loaded; the officer then

used a flashlight and observed jugs on the floor. The defendant admitted that he was
carrying "moonshine." The search was validated by the court.
3. See Wright v. State, 87 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1956).

4. Gaskins v. State, 89 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1956).
5. See Pegueno v. State, 85 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
that he was an expert on this subject matter (smelling mash). The defcndant admitted he had over 100 barrels of illegal liquor and consented
to a search. The arrest without a warrant was upheld as was the search
made incidental tlereto.r, The dissenting Justice" took the view that the
search was invalid because the search was accomplished by the officer
under a search warrant that was apparently illegal. The Justice believed that
the officer was motivated, not by the odor, but by the authority of the
search warrant. Likewise, the consent to search was obtained from the
defendant because of the supposed authority of the warrant.
Davis v. State detailed the power of arresting officers to search a
car and trailer. The car was owned by the defendant and driven by an
accomplice. Officers had the trailer under surveillance when the accomplice
drove to it with the car. They arrested the accomplice, and the defendant,
as lie emerged from the trailer. The defendant consented to a search of
the trailer, but not, apparently the car. The Court held that the search
was "an incident to the arrest."
In another case,8 officers stopped the defendant's car under unusual
circumstances. A series of filling station robberies had occurred and the
officers were informed by a passing motorist that a man was walking toward
a station with a crowbar. The officers stopped the defendant as he was
driving off and, thereafter, saw an adding machine (several of which had
been reported stolen that night) on the back seat of the car. An arrest
and search of the car followed. The Supreme Court validated both.
The Court again determined that an arrest based upon a "tip" does
0
not validate a search made without a search warrant.
II

SEARCH WARRANTS

Information Necessary Before a Search Warrant Issues-The Court

clarified its position on the legal sufficiency of the information contained
in the affidavit which forms the basis for issuance of the search warrant.
The facts related in the affidavit do not have to be admissible as evidence
is a criminal trial. However, the facts must demonstrate "probable cause,"
"reasonable belief" or "trustworthy information." In this case,10 the
affiant saw a confidential informant dial the defendant's telephone number
6. Justice Thomas, at pages 602-604. The Justice, however, did deny that "an
absolute rule" could be adopted that when a search warrant has been stricken and the
evidence produced under it has been suppressed, the prosecution ends.
7. 87 So.2d 416, 418-419 (Fla. 1956) (charge was breaking and entering with
intent to commit a misdemeanor). The facts of this case were very sparsely detailed.
8. Pflegl v. State, 93 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1957). Justices O'Connell, Thomas and
Ilobson dissented. This opinion reflects an inaccurate picture of federal constitutional
law; the dissenting justices assumed that the U.S. CONsT. Amend. IV, applies to state

governmental activities. It does not.
9. Sagonias v. State, 89 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla. 1956).
10. Perez v. State, 81 So.2d 201, 203-204 (Fla. 1955). Accord: Quince v. State, 91
So.2d 633 (Fla. 1956) (similar standard for affidavit information).
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and heard a woman who answered to the name of Teresa sell a lottery
ticket. The defendants were Eloy Perez and his wife, Teresa. The search
warrant, predicated upon this information, was validated.
The defendant argued that his home was illegally searched because
a statement in the affidavit described the property as "a one-story block
building to which a frame structure was attached." The defendant operated
a store in the "block building" and lived in the frame building; he
claimed that the two buildings were separate. However, the affiant had
stated that defendant occupied and controlled the premises and that he
had purchased a lottery ticket in the store from a woman who immediately
carried a record of the transaction into the living area. The court "linked"
the premises through this transaction.'
In Joyner v. Lakeland,' the defendant, who was convicted of possessing
lottery material, entered several unsuccessful arguments regarding the
language contained in a search warrant. The court stated that the description
of the place to be searched must be such as to lead, on inquiry, "the
officers unerringly to it"; that the word "premises" is sufficient if further
defined; that whether a lapse of eight days between issuance and execution of
the warrant is invalid was within the discretion of the judge, who did not
abuse his discretion; and that officers, in the course of a search under a
valid warrant, who discover unlawful articles not mentioned in the warrant
may seize such articles.
III

MISCELLANEOUS

DECISIONS

Two decisions discussed the search and seizure law in connection
with a consent or waiver of the accused to the search. The Court stated in
Sagonias v. State"3 that the state's evidence of consent to a search must
be "clear and convincing." The fact that the accused did not actively
resist the search was not adequate, nor did the accused's voluntary act of
unlocking the trunk of his car (to demonstrate that it was empty) for
the officers amount to a consent that the entire car be searched.
11. See Espinola v. State, 82 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1955).
12. See 90 So.2d 118 (Fla. 1956).
In Pflegl v. State, 93 So.2d 75, 77 (Fla. 1957), Justice O'Connell wrote a dissenting opinion in which lie raised the question whether a search warrant, based on
information which was obtained, as the justice believed, froin an invalid arrest and
search, could legally be used as the basis for a search.
Also, in Perez v. State, 81 So.2d 201, 204 (Fla. 1955), the court construed
the Florida legislation providing a punishment for the tapping of telephones "without
the consent of the owner," so that information obtained by the affiant (who petitioned
for the search warrant), by listening on an extension of a telephone which was used by
a "confidential infornant" to call the defendant's home, was not illegally used as a basis
for establishing a "probable cause." The federal legislation was similarly mentioned in

the defendant's argument.
13. 89 So.2d 252, 254 (Fla. 1956) (the accused voluntarily opened the glove
compartment; when the officer entered the front of the car lie noticed sacks containing
bolita tickets and money).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A waiver of the privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures
was found by the Court in another 1956 case.' 3 The reasoning of the
court was that the trial judge, who determined that the defendant consented to the search, was authorized to discredit the testimony of the
defendant whose position conflicted with that of the officers. The officer's
testimony showed that the defendant stated that he did "not mind if tile
officers looked in the car" and that he personally unlocked the trunk,
wherein the lottery materials were found.
The Court also determined that a corporation may not utilize the
searches and seizures privilege on behalf of a defendant in a criminal
case,15 and that a Florida court of equity does not have jurisdiction to
enjoin state officers from testifying in a federal court as to evidence secured
by the officers ii violation of the Florida law concerning searches and
seizures.'

EQUAL PROTECTION SITUATION
The strength of the equal protection limitation on governmental power
to a greater or lesser degree depends upon the relative strength of the
governmental police power.-' Probably no law is applied to all persons at

one and the same time. Children, the insane, women, men, the unhealthy,
corporations and wage earners, to name a few, have been the basis of
classification in the operation of law. So the basic premise we start with is
that some classifications, in the application of law, are legally possible.
That vague statcenct is niade even more ephemcral by the tcst, :' that a
classification is valid unless demonstrated to be not "reasonablc." It would
probably be impossible to draw a line between the "reasonable" of police
power exercise and the "reasonable" of equal protection.
I

'T

NON-NEGRO l)zESIONS4

Validated Legislation-In Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.
v. Nineteen Hundred One Collins Corp.,5 the Court stated that in "its
14. Slater v. State, 90 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla. 1956).
15. Vann v. State, 85 So.2d 133, 137 (Fla. 1956). The court, in this opinion,
is in error in its evalnation of federal constitutional law; the U.S. CONST. amend. IV, does
not inhibit state action, alone or through U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. Veiner v. Kelly, 82 So.2d 155, 157 (Fla. 1955) (the opinion is not too clear
as to whether some circumstances msight authorize such an injunction).
1. The statement in FLA. CONST. DECL .OF RIGHsS, § 1, is that "all men
are equal before the law . . .... .le federal equal protection clause, applicable to state
action, is found in U. S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. An impressive article on the federal concept can be found in Tussman and

Tenl3roek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
3. E.g., Rodriguez v. Jones, 64 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1953). Whether a law is
"reasonable"

is still the test for economic due process, see Note, 53 CoL, L. REv.

6 (1953); Fuller v. Watts, 74 So.Zd 676, 678 (Fla. 1954).
4. 'lTis classification is convenient in Florida.
5. 83 So.2d 865, 872 (Fla. 1956)(a U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, equal protection
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wisdom the Legislature" had distinguished between private wire service
and customary telephone service for purposes of regulation of the use of
communication facilities by gambling interests. The classification was sustained in view of the nature of the utilities and the subject regulated. Thus
the Court effectuated the legislative presumption of validity.
A 1957 decision' validated thc construction of water distribution
facilities by a municipality within the corporate limits of two other
municipalities. The Court stated that there would be no increase in cost
to the residents of the first city, which was the center of a large and
growing metropolitan area which included the other cities.
Likewise, workmen's compensation legislation was sustained against an
equal protection argument.7 The law provided for an "equitable distribution"
to compensation carriers by a court of equity. The fact that the award
would he different under the various situations arising under the law (which
provided a right to subrogation) did not deter the Court. That equal
protection "demands only" that the rights of all persons must rest upon
the same rule under similar circumstances, was the decisional standard.
Invalidated Legislation-Legislation which distinguished the regulation
powers of the Florida State Racing Commission to license fronton operators
was invalidated by the Court in a 1955 decision.8 The legislature provided
for an annual approval by the electorate in Palm Beach County before

the Commission could issue an operating license within that county. The
standard utilized to invalidate was as follows: "the attempted classification
must rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable . . . relation

to the act." That the classification affected all applicants in the one county
was held not sufficient.
The Supremc Court's approach to the substantive due process and
equal protection issues, when both arguments were directed against
legislation, failed to distinguish between the issues; that is to say, the
rationale of the Court treated the "reasonableness" of the police power
and the "reasonableness" of the equal protection classification, alike. Miami
v. Kayfetz,9 exemplified this. A city ordinance was invalidated under both
constitutional inhibitions, the Court using its factual conclusions on the
unreasonableness of the municipal activity, in a police power sense, to
justify invalidation under equal protection. The ordinance in question
6. State v. City of Melbourne, 93 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1957)
DEeL. OF RIcHTS, § 1, was the issue),

(FLA. CONST.

7. Insurance Co. of Texas v. Raincy, 86 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla. 1956) (From the
opinion it is difficult to determine which constitution is inissue).
8. See Fronton, Inc. v. Florida State Racing Commission, 82 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1955)
(both constitutions were in issue). Accord: Ilollenbecic v. State, 91 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1956);
in this case the legislation required certain conditions to be satisfied by an applicant
for a real estate license to be a salesman in Sarasota County; the U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV, equal protection clause, was in issue.
9. 92 So.2d 798, 804 (1957) (both constitutions were in issue; U.S. CoNs'r.
amend. XIV, and FLA. CONST. DeL. or RiFiius, § 1).
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prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages by owners of premises, wherein
liquor was consumed by employees.

Also invalidated was the most recent attempt by the legislature to
draft a constitutional' 0 blue law. The Court again insisted upon a "rational
. relationship" between the purpose of the Sunday Closing Law and
the businesses excluded from its operation."
*

.

1I Tinw

NEGRO DECISIONS''

In the last two Surveysl", this writer stated that in this limited field
One can say that Florida constitutional law and federal constitutional law
separate. '['he march of the United States Supreme Court up the broad
equal protection of the law's avenue, with reference to equal treatment for
citizens regardless of color, has not been matched by the Florida Supreme
Court. Trhe United States Supreme Court has been slowly crushing the
once wide discretionary segregation fields within the states' police power.
The recent Florida decisions cannot be characterized as particularly sympathetic to the aspirations of colored citizens to weaken the legal and
social segregation framework presently existent in Florida.

However the United States Constitution, 14 requires that the members
of the Florida judiciary interpret and apply the law of the United States
Constitution as it is determined in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. And one can scarcely justify, at least since the Civil War,
state court discretion as to which portion of the federal constitution shall
or shall not be effectuated within a state."
The most recent attempts of the tireless Hr. Hawkins, a negro, to
enter the University of Florida College of Law were again frustrated by
the Florida Court. In 1955,16 the Florida Court stated that it was controlled by the initial Brown decision, as modified by the United States
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.'T The Florida Court, therefore, took a step toward constutional legality in relation to equal protection,
education and the negro. In the remainder of the decision the Florida Court
tip-toed, perhaps, in the opposite direction by interpreting the Brown
implementation decision to apply to a graduate law school. This writer
believed that the United States Supreme Court, in implementing Brown,
10. From the opinion, and the decisions cited therein, it is not possible to determine
which equal protection clause-state or federal-was in issue.

11. See Kelly v. Blackhom, 95 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1957).
12. With few exceptions, and this is one, this paper does not discuss the Florida
Supreme Court's determination of federal constitutional law.
13. See Alloway, Florida Constitutioual Law, 8 MrAmi L.O., 185 (1954) and 10
Miami L.Q. 180 (1946).
14. U.S. CoNs?., art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy clause).
15. E.g., the language in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat, 304, 335 (1816).
16. State v. Board of Control, 83 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1955); Justices Thomas and
Sebring concurred in part and dissented in part.
17. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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did not intend to inter Sweatt v. Painter,8 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents.' Notwithstanding the legal inferences from the Sweatt
and McLaurin opinions, and a specific mandate from the United States
Supreme Court,20 the Florida Supreme Court appointed a court commissioner to take testimony of Mr. Ilawkins, the Board of Control and such
witnesses as they desired to produce, with a view of determining "all
questions as to time and manner of establishing new order." The Court
adopted the procedure under the supposed authority of the Brown implementation decree.
The finale of the action to assert a federal constitutional right in the
Florida court system approached with the 1957 version of State v. Board
of Control,;' in which the Florida Supreme Court refused to grant Mr.
H-awkins' motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus to admit him to
the University. This opinion recognized the federal constitutional right,
but determined that the Florida Court had "a sound judicial discretion as
to the date of the issuance of its process in order to precent a serious
public mischief." The laconic answer of the United States Supreme Court
was a denial of the petition for writ of certiorari "without prejudice to 22the
petitioner seeking relief in an appropriate United States District Court."
No denial of "due process or equal protection" was found by the Florida
Supreme Court in Thonas v. State,28 a case in which a negro had been
sentenced to death for rape because a majority of the jury failed to
recommend mercy. A statistical survey that demonstrated that in a 20 year
period 23 negroes were executed for a crine, while only one white defendant
was executed, was -not an adequate ground to invalidate the death sentence.
An unusual argument to invalidate a school bond issue was presented
in 1956.21 The Court held that "the segregation question" had no connection with the constitutionality of the issue; therefore, Florida Constitution, Article XII, section 12, which provides that white and colored
children shall not be taught in the same school, did not have to be
specifically followed. The argument would seem to create a situation which
would be the antithesis of the Brown desegregation cases.

18. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
19. 339 U.S. 637 (1950),
L.Q., 182 (1956).
20. 347 U.S. 971 (1954).

See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 10 MIAMI

21. 93 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1957). The 1955 Florida decision, see note 12 supra,
was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Board, 350 U.S. 413
(1956), the opinion stated that "[Mr. Hawkins] is entitled to prompt admission under
the rules . . . applicable to other qualified candidates." Justices Thomas and Drew
dissented.
22. 26 LAw WFns, 3118 (1957).
23. 92 So.2d 621, 625 (1957); accord: State v.Mayo, 87 So.2d 501, 503 (1956)
(the arguments were held to have been waived by the defendant, however, the Court
discussed the law involved-here the equal protection clauses of both constitutions).
24. State v. Special Tax School District No. 1, 86 So.2d 419, 421 (Fla. 1956).
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TRADITIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS (SPEECH,
ASSEMBLY, RELIGION AND PRESS)'

In Sheiner v. State" the Court indicated that "no lawyer . . .can
become a member of the Communist Party or other subversive organization
without forfeiting his privilege to practice law." This would seem to elininate in such disbarment cases possible freedoms of speech or assemblage
arguments.3
The constitutional status of organizational picketing in Florida was
securely anchored in the troubled waters of the Miami Beach hotel industry. Chief Justice Terrell, while admitting 4 that organizational picketing
is an "aspect" of freedom of speech, enacted a harsh, judicially-imposed
procedural obstacle course for a union attempting to enjoy some of that
freedom. For example, the union cannot indulge in the following practices:
I) institution of a picket line before the "showing of any lawful grievance"
against the employer, 2) negotiation with the employer before a showing
by "evidence of a substantial character" that the union is the authorized
bargaining agent of the employees by their choice, 3) use of a picket line
not made up of the employer's employees. Employer "bad faith" and "lack
of respect" for the union apparently does not alleviate the union's procedural requisites. '
'[he Court, in 1956," voided a circuit court's equity fashioned remedy
to deal with the representation problem. The lower court had appointed
a commissioner to hold a secret election in which the hotel's employees
could vote whether or not they desired the union to represent them. The
Court brushed aside the union's argument that "black-listing" would be
the penalty for employees whose names were produced in court and insisted
on traditional proof. The union's record of lost decisions would seem nearly
to equal that of the famous Mr. Hawkins.

1. The Florida

Court's activties

in this field,

from volume

49 through

80,

Southern Reporter, second series, were discussed in Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law,
8 MIAMI L.Q. 173, 175 (1954) and 10 MIAMH L.Q. 165 (1956).
2. 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955), Associate Justice Jones dissenting.
3. However, the Supreme Court also stated that if the attorney "shows panance,
that he was duped or misled . . ." he should not be disbarred; see Sheiner v. State,

82 So.2d 657, 662 (Fla. 1955).
4. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Employees Union, 92 So.2d 414, 418
(Fla. 1957).
5. Boca Raton Club v. lotel Employees Union, 83 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1955),

describes in some detail the steps a union must follow in negotiating with the
employer before a picket line is thrown up. None of the Florida decisions require a
majority of the employees to choose a bargaining agent, before picketing.

6. Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. IHotel Employees Union, 84 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1956).
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BILL OF ATTAINDER; RETROACTIVE LAW; IMPAIRMENT
OF CONTRACT AND EX POST FACTO DECISIONS
Bill of Attainder-A statute was upheld, against the claim that it
was a bill of attainder, that authorized municipal courts to revoke drivers'
licenses under certain conditions.' The court classified the use of the state's
roads as a "privilege," rather than a "right."
Retroactive Laws-The decision, Sharrow v. City of Dania,2 was difficult

to classify because the plaintiff's claim under the Florida Constitution 3

was not pleaded with particularity. The case involved an action by property
owners to prevent the revocation of a building permit issued by the city.
The permit was issued after the first reading of an ordinance requiring a
six foot building set-back, and the permit authorized a building based
upon plans not providing for a set-back. After the ordinance was adopted,
the city sought to revoke the permit. In the interval, the plaintiffs had
commenced work on the building. The Court stated that "if rights to
the permit became vested, such vesting was subject to the warning evidenced"
by the ordinance's first reading.
Impairment of Contract 4 -The Court stated5 that a legislative pension
commitment made to a judge, who accepted by surrendering the unexpired
portion of a term and retiring, "could not be impinged upon by a subsequent
legislature."
Once again,6 the Court refused to apply the "obligation of contracts"
clause to legislation affecting the "remedy." Involved in the case was a
statute that increased the period during which a workmen's compensation
award might be modified.
Ex Post Facto Laws-Associate Justice Cillis dissented in State v.
Evans,7 arguing that an cx post facto situation was created by the disbarment of an attorney for the commission of a federal crime. The Court
upheld the disbarment ground under the bar integration rules, which had
not been adopted until after the attorney had committed the act that
was the basis for the federal conviction.
1. Smith v. Gainesville, 93 So.Zd 105, 107 (Fla, 1957). See Southern Bell
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Nineteen Hundred One Collins Corp., 83 So.2d
865, 867, 873 (Fla. 1956).
2. 83 So.2d 274, 275 (Fla. 1955).
3. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., § 1. The U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, was also
pleaded.
4. FiL. CoNsT. DECL. OF RTS., § 17. The U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 may also
have been an issue. Newport Manor v, Carmen Land Co., 82 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1955),

may have involved the "obligation of contracts" provision (the Court failed to mention
any specific constitutional phraseology). The language of the chancellor was adopted
by the Court: "the right to construct a private sewer [under a public street] may be
so granted as to give the owner a vested right therein." Therefore, the sewer builder
had "exclusive use" of his facility.
5. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 82 So.2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1955).

6. See Walter Denson & Son v. Nelson, 88 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1956).
7. 94 So.2d 730, 737 (Fla. 1957).
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LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
I

ARTICLE III, SECTON

16

This section states that "Each law enacted in the Legislature shall
embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which
subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be amended
or revised by reference to its title only .

.

. " There were several cases,

in the last two years, interpreting these words.
In a 1957 decision,' the Court recognized several factors which were
within the range of the purpose of this constitutional requirement: (1)
to prevent "log rolling," or the practice of stating two unrelated matters
oI one bill; (2) to prevent "surprise or fraud" by notice in the title; (3) to
"fairly apprise the people" of the legislation's subject so that "they may
have an opportunity to be heard." The standard of the Court on review
under Article III, section 16, remained static; if the subject is "reasonably
connected" with the title language, the act will be upheld. In this connection, all provisions of the body of the act that are incidental to, or
promote the purpose of, the title subject will be validated. The Court again
stated that the "objects" of the act need not be reflected in the title,
only the "subject," and that the presumption of validity operates in
review under the constitutional requirement.
The constitutional argument against the validity of the statute, in this
decision, was that the title stated that the statute regulated pharmacy, while
the statute also regulated drug stores. The Court refused to invalidate
simply because the legislature, in the past, had treated these concerns
as independent subjects, and held that the regulations of the sales of
medicines prepared by pharmacists was a subject "closely related" to the
broad abstraction "Pharmacy."
Also upheld by the Court was a statute, the title to which authorized
an airport board to condemn land without restricting the acquisition of land
to the area of the municipality. The body of the statute restricted the
acquisition of property by the board to the city's limits and fifteen miles
beyond those limits. The Court reasoned that the appellees were not injured
by a lack of notice in the title concerning the limitation, in the body, on the
power of eminent domain, and that the title could not have misled appellees
into believing that the board's power was restricted to the city limits.2
In one case,3 the Court reiterated its position that the body of an
act cannot be "broader" in coverage than the title language indicates.
1. See State v. Canova, 94 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1957).

2. Panama City Airport Board v. Laird, 90 So.2d 616, 619 (Fla. 1956).
3. State v. Tindell, 88 So.2d 123, 124-125 (Fla, 1956). The title referred to
"all counties having a population of . . . (490,000) or more, . . . in each judicial
circuit." The body stated that: each judicial circuit . . - which embraces . . . a
population of more than . . . (490,000)."
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II ARTcLE II, SECTION 20
This section states that: "The Legislature shall not pass special or

local laws in any of the following . . . cases: . . . regulating the jurisdiction
and duties of . . . officers, . . . punishment of crime . . . , regulating the
practice of courts . . ., for .. conducting elections ...
The legislature provided, in a population act applicable to counties
having a population of not less than 113,000 and not more than 150,000
persons, a longer time for candidates for county officers between the qualifying date and the primary election date. The Court stated that if the larger
counties, generally, had been included, the act would have had a "reasonable" basis for classification, since in such counties more time to canvass
4
the electors would be needed.
The Court validated5' a population act providing pensions for the
widows of circuit judges in any judicial circuit embracing two or more
counties, where one has a population of more than 300,000 persons; the
largest county was required to pay the entire amount. The act was characterized as a "general law," to which Article IT1, section 20, did not apply.
That judges have more to do in large counties apparently made the act
not "unreasonable." A county population act, geared to a population ratio
that can be entered "reasonably" by other counties, was declared a "general
act."
In Hollenbeck v. Statef the Court held unconstitutional an act, applying only to Sarasota County, which demanded a residence condition for real
estate salesmen desiring to register that was not required in other counties.
III

ARTICLE III, SECIrio

21

The section states that: "In all cases enumerated in the preceding
Section, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation . . . , but in all
cases not enumerated . . the Legislature may pass special or local
laws, . . . PROVIDED that no local or special law shall be passed . . .
unless notice of intention to apply therefor shall have been published in
the manner provided . .. ."
It was decided, in Hialeah v. Pfaffendorf,7 that the "substance" of
the contemplated act, under Article I11, section 21, need not be published
4. State v. Newell, 85 Sd.2d 124, 127 (Fla. 1956)(the word "elections" in
art. 1II, § 20, was held to include "primary" elections). Art. lII, § 21, was also in issue);
5. See Greene v. Cray, 87 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1956) (art. Ill, § 21, was also in issue);
dccord, Board v. County Budget Comm., 90 So.2d 707 (Fla. 1956). The factors: the
court determined the basis of classification "reasonably related to the purposes to be
effected, based on differences in population;"

and the act was "potentially applicable

to other counties." art. Ill, § 21, was in issue, also.
6. 91 So.2d

177, 178 (Ma.

1956)(no reason was given by the court on this

issue; however, U)S. CONST. amend. XIV was referred to, in connection with equal
protection of the laws).
7. 90 So.2d 596, 598-599 (Vla. 1956).
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in the required "notice." Howcvcr, the constitutional "notice" could not be
avoided by the Legislature by a recitation in the journals that the "notice"
requirement was satisfied.
Article IIl, section 21, provides an alternative method by which the
legislature may enact special or local laws; the second procedure requires a
"referendum election to be called and held in the territory affected." Tile
Court stated that legislative compliance with the "notice" procedure obviated
the necessity of compliance with the "referendum" method.'
BONDS AND TI-IE CONSTITUTION
I

ARTICLE IX, SEC'noN 6

This constitutional section reads as follows: "The Legislature shall have
power to provide for issuing state bonds only for ... repelling invasion . . .
and the Counties, Districts, or Muncipalities . . . shall . . . issue bonds
only after the same shall have been approved by a majority of the votes
cast ... in such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities ... (by freeholders] ."
Bonds or Certificates Payable from Improvement Revenues, or from
other than Ad Valorem Taxation Sources.-This judicially inspired exception
to the vote requisites of Article IX, section 6, was consistently adhered
to by the Court during this Survey period.' From the number of cases

decided, it would appear that much of Florida improvement financing is
avoiding the censorship of the local electorates.
In Fisher v. Dade County, 2 the Court invalidated a bond issue to
finance public improvements in a "Special Improvement Service District."
Under the statutory arrangement, annual ad valorem taxes, to support the
bond issue, were to be levied within the district. The Court indicated that

8. Pinellas County v. Laumer, 94 So.2d 827, 839-840 (Fla. 1957) (the court
eonstned the words "territory affected," anyway). Section 20 was also in issue; the court
determined that a zoning law affecting a county was not regulated by section 20;
therefore, a special or local law on this subject was valid.
1. See State v. North Broward Hospital Dist., 95 So.2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1957)
(question raised as to whether the project was economically feasible); State v. City of
Melbourne, 93 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1957)(also, due process and equal protection issues
under the state constitution); State v. City of Cocoa, 92 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1957)
(economic feasibility of project was questioned); State v. Florida State Turnpike
Authority, 89 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956)(FI.A. CoNSr. art. IX, §§ 4, 10, were also in
issue); State v. North Miami, 89 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1956); State v. Florida Development
Commission, 84 So.2d 707 (Fla. 1956); State v. Inter-American Center Authority,
84 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1955) (FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 10, 1, were also in issue, as were
FLA. CoNs'. DECL. OF RTS. §§ 1, 12); State v. Monroe County, 81 So.2d 522 (Fla.
1955); Lynn v. Fort Lauderdale, 81 So.2d 511 (Fla. 1955)(the police power of the
state was also in issue).
2. See 84 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1956). A referendum was held within the district;
the Court, at page 579, stated that the arrangement would be invalid, under art. IX,
§ 6, without such a vote. The apparent basis for the invalidation was FLA. Coxsr. art. X,
§ 7 (the homestead provision).
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such a plan would be constitutionally fcasible only if the taxes were
particularly related to the lands "specially benefited" by the improvements.
Financing on the "Necessity" Basis-This judicial exception to the
vote requirement in Article IX, section 6, means that compliance with
Section 6 is not necessary when a government desires to finance an improvement that is a "necessity," in something of a vital sense, to the government. In 19574 the Court concluded that operation of a hospital was
not "an essential function of government" because "the county government
would [not] cease to exist" without it; a much more fiberal approach to the
"necessity" exception can be found in a 1956 decision, 5 wherein a county
office building, a children's home and improvements to the county courthouse were apparently characterized as a governmental "necessity."0
DECISIONS CONCE.RNING MISCELLANEOUS
CONSTITUTIONAL INHIBITIONS
The Secret Ballot-One decision ' contained a statement describing
the "constitutional privilege" that "knowledge of [the voter's] decision at
the polls remains his own." Having classified the constitutional guaranty
as a privilege, the Court naturally authorized the voter to waive the guaranty by permitting someone else to learn for whom he voted.
Amending the Constitution-The legislature adopted a resolution proposing an amendment to Florida Constitution, Article VIII, section 11,2
which provided "home rule" for Dade County in local affairs. A declaratory
action was commenced to determine the validity of the proposed amendinent before it was submitted to the state electorate.
Florida Constitution, Article XVIII, section 1, provides a method for
amending the constitution: "Either branch of the Legislature . .

may

propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this
Constitution. Any such revision or amendment may relate to one subject
or any number of subjects, but no amendment shall consist of more than
one revised article of the Constitution." The Court held that the proposed
amendment was limited to one "subject" (home rule for the county); however, the chancellor had determined that the words "one revised article"
meant that "no amendment of a single article [could] limit, restrict or
modify the provisions of any other article." The Court disagreed with the
chancellor's construction of the words "one revised article," and stated that
3. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q., 158, 194 (1954).
4. State v. County of Manatee, 93 So.2d 381, 383 (FlI. 1957).
5. See State v. County of Palm Beach, 89 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1956) (Justices Thornal
and Drew concurred specially; Justice Thomas dissented).
6. The Court also construed FLA. CoNsT. art. XII, § IS (which provides for
public school financing), in State v. State Board, 89 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. 1956).

1. McDonald v. Miller, 90 So.2d 124, 127 (Fla. 1956).
2. See the introductory materials in this paper.
3. See Gray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1956).
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as long as the proposed amendment was limited to one subject, it could
'accomplish that subject even though it affects other provisions of the
Constitution."
Secondly, the chancellor had held that the provisions of the proposed
amendment were "inconsistent, conflicting and contradictory." The Court
found no such apparent problem in the proposed amendment language
and stated that if the electorate in Dade County, subsequent to the adoption
by the state electorate of the amendment, approved a local home rule
charter which transcended the amendment, or proved unworkable, then
the Court would permit such an assault. Thus the genesis of Florida's initial
experiment, in local home rule, was not strangled in the constitutional
verbiage of Article XVII, section 1.

